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#### War powers policy analysis is plagued with flawed scholarship based on constructed threats to US national security – these threats reify the power of the executive while resulting in endless warfare – questioning the underlying assumptions of the knowledge presented in the 1AC is critical to creating a base for substantive political change

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Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today’s dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, by way of a conclusion I would like to assess them more directly and, in the process, indicate what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the U.S. faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create of world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of Herring’s national security state, with the U.S. permanently mobilized militarily to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike – at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decisionmaking are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency (one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint)188 greatly outweigh the costs. Yet, although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides – and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be – remains open as well. Clearly technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet, in truth they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments, assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view – such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have – at times unwittingly – reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America’s post-World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that “our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century,” was no longer “adequate” for the “20th- century nation.” For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country’s “preeminen[ce] in political and military power.” Fulbright held that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself “burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.”192 According to Fulbright, the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States’ own ‘national security’ rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principal and overriding danger facing the country. According to the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2009 “[t]here were just 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide” (sixteen abroad and nine at home).194 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers – which have been consistent in recent years – place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger – requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization – such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit ‘national security’ aims highlights just how entrenched Herring’s old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States’ massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions – like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home – shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. This means that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underscores that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of ‘expertise.’ 195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm – the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed, its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’ – marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact – than policymakers admit. If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the r elationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars – emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness – is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants – danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently – it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The p roblem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

#### Describing Iran as a security threat crowds out discussions on root causes of conflict and cause self-fulfilling prophecies

Limbert 12 (John, “We Need to Talk to Iran, But How? Thirty-two years of sanctions and bluster haven't worked. It's time to try something different)

It was easy enough to miss amid all the chest-thumping, threats, and talk of imminent strikes filling the airways, but last week, Iran signaled its willingness to restart talks with the P5+1 (the five U.N. Security Council members plus Germany) about its nuclear program. "We hope the P5+1 meeting will be held in near future," Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said, as a group of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) toured the country. The last round of such talks ended inconclusively in Istanbul in January 2011, and it has taken more than a year to get close to a new meeting. Although no date has been set for the new talks, it's not too early to begin planning for how to make them more productive than past negotiations. Here are a few steps that could put us on a road more promising than the current ominous exchanges. 1. DON'T UNDERESTIMATE THE RISK OF MISCALCULATION It is tempting to dismiss the current talk of war as bluff and bluster. Although there is certainly much hot air in the current talk of Iran's closing the Strait of Hormuz or of imminent Israeli attacks on Iran, its very volume and frequency should make us worry. Each threat, each warning, each "red line" declared threatens to trap the parties in rhetorical corners. Even worse, a party might start believing its own defiant rhetoric and fail to distinguish between real and imaginary threats. Complicating the issue is the fact that the United States and Iran have almost never spoken officially to each other in more than 30 years. Diplomats do not meet; officials do not talk; and military officials to not communicate. Instead of contact in which each side can listen to the other, take the measure of personalities, and look for underlying interests behind public positions, each side has imputed the worst possible motives to the other, creating an adversary both superhuman (devious, powerful, and implacably hostile) and subhuman (violent, irrational, and unthinking). This mutual demonization -- born of fear and contempt -- raises the risk that a simple confrontation will lead to miscalculation and full-scale conflict. Put simply, today, in the absence of direct communication, it would be very difficult to de-escalate a potential incident in the Persian Gulf or Afghanistan. With each side assuming the worst about the other, a minor incident could lead both sides into military and political disaster. 2. REACT CAUTIOUSLY Current events are not running in Iran's favor, despite its bombastic rhetoric. The overthrow of longtime despots in Tunisia and Egypt raised an obvious question for Iranian leaders: "Why not here?" Iranians chanted in the streets, Tunes tunest; Iran natunest ("Tunisia could; Iran could not"). As for Bahrain, the Islamic Republic could only watch and denounce as a Sunni-dominated government with Saudi support suppressed fellow Shiites. Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, one of Iran's few reliable friends in the region, is engulfed in a burgeoning civil war. A frustrated Iran is one that will lash out in all directions -- at Israel, at the United States, at Britain (as in the recent attack on its embassy in Tehran), and at Saudi Arabia (as in the alleged plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States with the help of Mexican drug cartels). Nonetheless, U.S. negotiators should be careful not to overreact to every claim, every statement, and every bit of bluster coming from the harried leaders in Tehran. Iran would like Washington to dance to its tune, and it likes to show its power by provoking America into unwise reactions. In such cases, language matters, and U.S. diplomats should be measured, clear, and cautious. Let the other side rant and rave. 3. SMASH THE ATOM If these future talks -- or any talks -- deal only with Iran's nuclear program, they will fail. For better or worse, the nuclear program has become highly symbolic for the Iranian side. Exchanges on the subject have become an exercise in "asymmetric negotiation," in which each side is talking about a different subject to a different audience for a different purpose. The failure of such exchanges is certain, with both sides inevitably claiming afterward, "We made proposals, but they were not listening." For Americans, the concern is technical and legal matters such as the amounts of low- and high-enriched uranium, as well as the type and number of centrifuges in Iran's possession. For Iranians, the negotiations are about their country's place in the world community -- its rights, national honor, and respect. As such, any Iranian negotiator who compromises will immediately face accusations of selling out his country's dignity. Such was the case 60 years ago between Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadegh and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company when the British insisted on the sanctity of contracts and the Iranians sought to rectify a relationship out of balance for over a century. Today, the United States risks falling into the same trap of mutual incomprehension. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's words on the subject are revealing. He says, "We do not believe in making atomic bombs. We believe that goes against human morality." He adds, however, that the decision to build or not build such a weapon is Iran's decision to make. No one else -- not the United States, the United Nations, the IAEA, or the European Union -- can tell Iran what to do. It is Iran's right to make that decision. In other words, "Others are seeking to impose their will on us; we are seeking to assert our national rights." 4. BROADEN THE CONVERSATION So if not nukes, what should the talks be about? If U.S. negotiators are interested in going beyond the most difficult issue on the table -- Iran's nuclear program -- and exploring areas where "yes" is possible, they need to be talking about Afghanistan, Iran, terrorism, drugs, piracy, and other areas where, in a rational world, there exists basis for agreement. Such will never happen, however, if U.S. and Iranian officials cannot talk to each other. Before the United States enters another round of talks, it must make certain that the Iranians will not re-enact the farce of their January 2011 meeting with the P5+1 in Istanbul. At that session, Iranian representative Saeed Jalili, apparently under instructions from Tehran, deliberately avoided a bilateral meeting with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns. The sad irony is that, among senior U.S. officials, Burns is probably the only one prepared to listen seriously to Iranian concerns. In fact, the two had met productively in Geneva in 2009 to discuss a deal to supply fuel to Tehran's research reactor. If the Iranians won't talk to Burns, however, then there is no one in Washington who will listen to them. Of course there is little one can do if the Iranians insist on rubbing salt into self-inflicted wounds. But they should know the opportunity is there. Although the Geneva deal eventually collapsed, those 2009 talks are still the only high-level meeting between U.S. and Iranian officials during Barack Obama's presidency. Iranians and Americans need to be talking again at that level, and about much more than just their nuclear programs. In the preparations for the next round of talks, the Americans -- through the designated P5+1 channel -- should make two points: 1. Burns looks forward to a bilateral meeting with his Iranian counterpart. 2. He is prepared to listen to Iranian concerns on all issues and explore areas of potential agreement and further discussion. 5. MANAGE EXPECTATIONS The United States should be wary of overplaying its hand -- something it often accuses the Iranians of doing. It should be realistic about the effectiveness of so-called "punishing" and "biting" sanctions. Just who gets punished and bitten by these measures? Such actions may have their effects, though perhaps not on those in Tehran whom America is seeking to influence. If Iran cannot sell crude oil, it will clearly be in serious trouble. But if sanctions do not bring the Iranians to yield -- and 32 years of sanctions have not done so -- the only way to do so may be long-term measures to lower the world oil price so that Iran faces an economic crisis it cannot avoid no matter how much oil it sells. Nor should the United States oversell the "threat" from Iran. The Islamic Republic, through its economic mismanagement, inept diplomacy, and talent for making gratuitous enemies, is chiefly a threat to itself. Although the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is very worrying to others in the region, it is difficult to see how a nuclear weapon serves Iran's interests or helps the current authorities stay in power. A nuclear weapon is of no use against urban demonstrators seeking a government that treats them decently or against restive ethnic minorities seeking cultural rights and a fair share of political and economic power. The chief threat to the Islamic Republic, in the government's own words, is not an invasion of foreign armies, but a "soft overthrow," a velvet revolution fueled by hostile foreign countries and local Iranian "seditionists." Whenever negotiations occur, there will be no quick breakthroughs. If there is any progress, it will be slow, and it will measured in small achievements -- something not said, a handshake, an agreement to meet again, a small change in tone. Above all, what is needed is patience and forbearance. The Americans cannot simply throw up their hands and say, "Well, we tried, but they are just too irrational (or devious, or suspicious). Let's return to what we have always done." One thing is clear: Three decades of demonization and hostility have accomplished nothing. Both sides need to stop shouting and start listening.

#### Security discourse sanitizes global destruction by proliferating symptom-focused solutions to power imbalances—-causes cycles of violence that make extinction and war power abuses inevitable

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This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of ‘scarcity’ in response to ecological, energy and economic crises [critical security studies] in the context of the historically-speciﬁc socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises [historical sociology and historical materialism]. Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conﬂictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to addressthe relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84 Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. 86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.87 By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nulliﬁed under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to ‘securitise’them– and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conﬂict and militarisation responsible for magniﬁed global insecurity. ‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military– police measures in purported response to an existential danger.89 The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system [geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on], phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conﬂicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafﬁcking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed [given that state power itself is constituted by these structures] deserve protection. This justiﬁes the state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. 3.2 From theory to policy Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential ‘threat-multipliers’ of traditional security issues such as ‘political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens’. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a ‘stress-multiplier’ that will ‘exacerbate tensions’ and ‘complicate American foreign policy’; while the EU perceives it as a ‘threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability’. 95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this ‘securitisation’ of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conﬂict up to 2050. It warns of ‘resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies’, particularly due to a projected ‘youth bulge’ in the South, which ‘will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy’. This will prompt a ‘return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets’. Finally, climate change will ‘compound’ these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conﬂict are ominous.’ 97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conﬂict.’ 98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conﬂict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’ 99 3.3 Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation? Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new ‘outsider’ identities is insufﬁcient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. 101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of‘othering’in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in accordance with a speciﬁc socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin’s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.104 Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new ‘outsider’ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed ‘outsider’ group vindicating various forms of violence. Conclusions While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a ‘human security’ approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to ‘non-traditional’ security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conﬂict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts – which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies – as a discourse – is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies [which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures]. This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost – precisely because the efﬁcacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conﬂict per se. Neither ‘resource shortages’ nor ‘resource abundance’ [in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms] necessitate conﬂict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to con- ﬂict. The ﬁrst is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy ‘reform’ is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global ﬁnancial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to [1] fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and [2] translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reﬂection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse ‘Others’, newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously ampliﬁed by global crises – a process that guarantees the intensiﬁcation and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences – drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences – is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

#### Reject the 1AC – focusing on knowledge production is critical to changing power relationships

Neocleous 08 (Mark Neocleous is a Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University London, "Critique of Security", 2008, p. 160-86)

In a letter of 3 August 1931, written from his fascist prison cell,¶ Gramsci noted that delving deeply into the concept of the state¶ requires delineating the history of intellectuals.51 Nowhere is this truer¶ than with the national security state, which employs a broad range¶ of individuals who may be loosely grouped together as 'security¶ intellectuals'. Of such intellectuals Robin Luckham notes:¶ The majority are employed by the military, the police, and¶ intelligence services. But there are others whose connection to¶ the armament culture is less direct: academics on government¶ contracts, analysts employed in quasi independent'think tanks',¶ or members of the research and security branches of political¶ parties. Their most characteristic products are strategic, political,¶ or economic assessments of current events and scenarios that¶ spell out the likely consequences of future policies, decisions, and¶ events."¶ I want to expand Luckham's argument beyond armaments and¶ explore the security intellectual, and to do so by situating their key¶ institutional home, the university, within the broader configuration of¶ a hegemonic and fetishistic ideology of security.¶ To make this argument requires a particular kind of focus, requiring¶ us to leave aside several issues relating to the role of universities in the¶ military industrial complex. First, I shall focus on the social sciences,¶ and so leave aside the question of the natural sciences and related¶ fields such as computing, since much of the detail and debate con-¶ cerning the role of mercenary science'in the national security state is¶ well known. Intellectuals within the social sciences, in contrast, often¶ like to think of themselves as situated at a more comfortable distance¶ from the centres of power, retaining an autonomy which allows them¶ to cast more critical judgement on key policy issues. Yet as we shall¶ see, many of the disciplines within the social sciences have not only¶ ended up operating within the same discursive practices that con-¶ stitute an unreflective apology for the national security state and its¶ imperialist drive, but they have often been forged by the national¶ security state for that very purpose. Second, this will not be the place¶ to spell out yet again the revolving door that exists between the world¶ of academia and the world of national security. Third, I will avoid¶ reiterating well-known details concerning the security services'use of¶ 'liaison officers', 'officers-in-residence', and 'persons of trust' within¶ universities, and the use of universities as recruiting grounds for the¶ security services." Fourth, I will forego discussing at any length the¶ surveillance under which many academics have been placed, not¶ just socialists and communists but also those involved in campaigns¶ around civil liberties, peace, race and the environment. Finally, I will¶ eschew the debate concerning the supposed fundamental disjuncture¶ between academia and the security services, namely that while the¶ former relies on openness, the latter relics on secrecy, and the idea¶ that these distinct worlds have to be kept apart if intellectual work is¶ to be accorded any respect. This goes without saying, but it barely¶ scratches the surface of what is in fact a far deeper problem. But what¶ then is there left to address?¶ In 1976 the US Senate revealed that well over a thousand books¶ had been produced, subsidised or sponsored by the CIA before the¶ end of 1967.54 If we take this figure back to the official birth of the CIA,¶ that works out at over a book a week, for twenty years. In many cases¶ the books in question became important works in their academic¶ fields. I want to explore the ways in which such a project allowed the¶ security agencies to determine the central concepts, approaches and¶ concerns adopted by intellectuals, shaping the work of those in key¶ disciplines as well as the subjects about which the discipline claimed¶ to be writing. This is indicative of a long standing desire within the¶ CIA to depend more on 'a community of scholars than on a network¶ of spies' (George Bush), and thus a more general desire to appear to¶ be more of an 'intellectual' organisation rather than a security-driven¶ one. Speaking of attempts to work with academia during the 'war¶ on terror', one CIA official commented that 'we don't want to turn¶ [academics] into spies . . . We want to capture them intellectually',58¶ part of a wider historical desire to make the CIA seem more like 'a¶ university without students and not a training school for spies', as one¶ figure put it/° And what better way to capture academics intellectually¶ than to forge and shape the very disciplines required by the security¶ state in the first place?¶ My interest, then, lies in the making and remaking of academic¶ disciplines and sub disciplines to further the security project. In other¶ words, I am interested more in what has been prescribed rather than¶ proscribed. This prescription is not about recruitment or surveillance;¶ it is not even about 'collaboration'. Rather, it is about the production¶ of knowledge at the highest level: the fabrication of intellectual¶ disciplines or sub disciplines through what Bruce Cumings describes¶ as the displacement and reordering of the boundaries of scholarly¶ research.57 It is not just that the basic techniques of the security state¶ employed by the FBI and CIA'depended upon conceptual, methodo-¶ logical, and technological developments in which social scientists . ..¶ were intimately involved'.58 It is also that the conceptual, methodo¶ logical and technological developments were actually shaped by the¶ key security institutions. In other words, in the constant reshaping of¶ society, the project of security colonised the minds of the intelligentsia¶ shaping disciplinary knowledge by forging the very disciplines¶ themselves and thus, in the process, generating a guardian class of¶ social scientists for the security of bourgeois order. What we are¶ talking about, then, is the centrality of the security intellectual to the¶ regimes of knowledge produced by and for the national security state¶ and thus, given the importance of security knowledge to the ideology¶ of security as a whole, the ways in which the security intellectual has¶ provided a key role in establishing certain forms of discourse as the¶ 'common sense'of politics. Canons, rather than cannons, are therefore¶ the issue; research topics prescribed by national security, and thus¶ research topics not covered; the invention of certain kinds of discourse¶ and thus the proscription of others; the creation of disciplines and foci¶ and thus the policing of others; a radical project of Gleichschaltimg¶ around the logic of security. The connection with more recent attempts¶ to continue in this vein will hopefully be apparent.^9¶ The original Rberstadt Report outlining the need for a unified¶ National Security Council had stressed the importance of educational¶ institutions as channels of communication between the military and¶ civilian population, and the National Security Act 1947 subsequently¶ established a research and development board to stimulate research¶ and development programmes in the armed forces, with the 'be-¶ havioural sciences'specifically included in the mandate. The significant¶ differences between the 'Cold War7 and previous confrontations¶ required a new approach to political intelligence, especially the social,¶ psychological, economic, political and cultural differences between¶ those committed to 'freedom' and 'security and the totalitarian other.¶ The first requirement, then, was knowledge of Russia.¶ In mid 1947 the Carnegie Corporation was in touch with a number¶ of universities about the state of knowledge of Russia, in particular on¶ the part of social scientists, noting that the state itself lacked the¶ personnel to conduct inquiries into long term research on issues of a¶ social, psychological and anthropological nature pertaining to Russia¶ and its people. The outcome was a proposal of July 1947, called¶ 'Russian Studies', exploring the possibility of an institute in this field¶ based in one of the major universities, with Harvard as first choice. In¶ discussions later that year it was made clear that the argument for the¶ research and centre 'is admirably set forth in the recent article on¶ Sources of Soviet Conduct by X in Foreign Affairs'.\*0 James J. Angleton¶ had already established a Soviet Division in the CIA in late 1947,¶ one of the main purposes of which was to reach out to universities¶ providing money for language study and area training, and the¶ developing Center at Harvard coincided with the push by William¶ Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and in¶ some ways the founder of the CIA, George Kennan and John Patton¶ Davies, to bring large amounts of state and corporate funding to the¶ universities through what was originally intended to be an institute of¶ Slavic studies.61 On the one hand, then, the Russian Research Center¶ had all the trappings of academic gravitas. Based in one of the world's¶ leading universities, it could also boast of the involvement of highly¶ rated intellectuals such asTalcott Parsons, one of the original members¶ of the Center's Executive Committee. On the other hand, for both¶ Harvard and the individuals, the Center was never just an intellectual¶ arena. The fact that none of the four members of the founding¶ Executive Committee had studied Russian affairs or had knowledge of¶ Russian, that its Director was an OSS veteran who had worked on the¶ anthropology of Japan, and that Secretary of State George Marshall¶ sat on the Board of Trustees of the Carnegie Corporation, is perhaps¶ telling. More important than their'expert'knowledge was the willing¶ ness of academics to break down any barriers between the university¶ and the security state. This had been especially true of Parsons, who¶ strongly approved of either overtly or covertly attaching universities to¶ the intelligence apparatus, to the extent of using Harvard connections¶ to help case the entry to the US of people accused of collaborating¶ with the Nazis.\*2 Concomitantly, those involved in the Center were¶ often responsible for denouncing other scholars to the security¶ services due to doubts about their loyalty. The point, however, is that¶ the Russian Research Center was deeply involved with the security¶ agencies from the outset and that several Foundations, not only¶ Carnegie but also Rockefeller and Ford, worked with the Center in¶ the funding of projects. As we shall see, as key institutions of the¶ American ruling class the Foundations would play an important role,¶ not only in developing Russian studies, but also the other key¶ disciplines that will become part of the security project.¶ From such a model other such centres emerged as universities¶ elsewhere followed suit, across the world as well as in the US. Out of¶ such institutes and their collaboration - with each other as well as¶ with the security services a new discipline was being formed:¶ Russian studies (or 'Soviet studies' - the terms were thought inter-¶ changeable). By 1965 more than two dozen American universities had¶ Soviet or East European centres, while more than three thousand¶ scholars identified themselves as interested principally in Soviet or¶ Slavic concerns."3 As such, Russian/Soviet studies was not just a means¶ for universities to liaise with the security services, it was in fact a¶ product of the security project. To be sure, what eventually came to¶ pass as Russian/Soviet studies would include scholars with a variety of¶ views,03 but the main point is clear: the academic stud)' of the Soviet¶ Union not only shadowed the rise of the national security state, but¶ also the US national security state shaped Soviet studies politically¶ and intellectually.'American Sovietology', Stephen Cohen comments,¶ 'was created as a large academic profession during the worst years of¶ the cold war'.\*5¶ This is clear from the model through which the Soviet Union was¶ understood, namely 'totalitarianism', which coincided neatly with the¶ wider development of the term outside of the academy. As developed¶ initially by Friedrich and Brzczinski, 'totalitarian' was taken to mean¶ a one-party state, organised through terroristic police control, with a¶ monopoly or near-monopoly over the means of communication¶ and the military, centralised control of the economy, and an official¶ ideology.6" We have seen in previous chapters how this simply ignores¶ the real history of states and movements which genuinely thought¶ themselves 'totalitarian'. The point here is that the model simply¶ describes certain features of the Soviet regime, building them into a¶ definition of'totalitarianism'such that the Soviet Union emerges as¶ the epitome of the totalitarian regime.'Totalitarianism'thereby became¶ the dominant category in Russian/Soviet studies, the consensus¶ underpinning vast swathes of Sovietology. It was also quickly taken¶ up and turned into a key analytic tool within political science more¶ generally.This is a paramount, though by no means the only, example,¶ as we shall see, of political science as ideology, in which a whole¶ research agenda was built around what was essentially an anti-¶ communist slogan."' A term that had been used in official and popular¶ discourse now had the air of intellectual gravitas, as more and more¶ scholars working within the Institutes and Centers used it without¶ question. And if thev did not genuinely believe it, then the Loyalty¶ Program encouraged them not to ask too many critical questions."\*¶ The logic of totalitarianism as used in Russian/Soviet studies had as¶ its corollary the logic of freedom being propagated by the US state as¶ its own version of the good society. 'It is obvious that in using the¶ totalitarian model', comments Alfred Meyer, 'American scholars were¶ also celebrating Americanism'."' This then became the driving force¶ behind the invention of American studies. By 1948 some sixty US¶ institutions were offering undergraduate degrees in the field, com-¶ pared with just seven institutions during the war. Postgraduate¶ programmes similarly expanded, and American studies programmes¶ began to be launched in other countries, such as the 'Americanistics'¶ programme at Amsterdam from 1947 and the Sal/burg Seminar in¶ American Studies launched by Harvard students in the city in the¶ same year. Key journals in the field began to be published in this¶ period, such as American Quarterly from 1949, and key organisations¶ were launched such as the American Studies Association in 1951.¶ While Paul Bove is right to argue that compared to other area studies,¶ American studies had no integral links to the security state,71 in¶ focusing very much on 'American identity' and the 'American way of¶ life' the emerging discipline nonetheless performed an important¶ ideological function. Witness, for example, the report of a conversation¶ between Richard Hoggart and a young American Fulbright scholar¶ who was trying to explain what the discipline of American studies was¶ all about. Hoggart was having difficulty grasping the idea until his¶ interlocutor, after repeated efforts, finally blurted out: 'but you don't¶ understand, I believe in America'.'7 In peddling such belief and pan-¶ dering to the myth of consensus, freedom and democracy found in the¶ security-identity-loyalty complex, American studies offered a neat¶ contrast with the image of the totalitarian Soviet Union emerging¶ from within Russian studies, a contrast which reinforced the notion of¶ American exccptionalism and fitted comfortably with the imperialist¶ and authoritarian ideology then being more widely propagated.¶ Unsurprisingly, it too attracted corporate and state funding.'5¶ At issue here, however, is not simply the generation of Russian or¶ Soviet studies on the one hand and American studies on the other.¶ Both were part and parcel of the growing trend for the national¶ security state to shape intellectual labour within the university. Out¶ of such 'schools for strategy'74 emerged the key concepts of Cold¶ War confrontation and a justification for the logic and polity of¶ containment. Since the security project had by now become nothing¶ less than a project for the reshaping of global order, knowledge of all¶ problematic or potentially problematic nations, states and regions¶ became necessary. The security of the new global American empire¶ required an intellectual infrastructure producing the kind of¶ knowledge of the various 'areas' of the globe which were, or might¶ become, an issue. And since most major nations, states and regions¶ were either political enemies, potential enemies, or economic com-¶ petitors and therefore possibly just as dangerous, rather a lot of'areas'¶ needed to be covered - more or less the whole world, in fact. 'How¶ shall we build this national program for area studies?'asked a report¶ produced by the Social Science Research Council in 1947.'First, we¶ must work toward complete world coverage.'75¶ 'Area studies' per se thus came to the fore, with Russian/Soviet¶ studies quickly followed by Asian studies, South Asian studies,¶ Japanese studies, Middle Fastcm studies, African studies, West¶ European studies, Latin American studies, and so on, multiplying from¶ a mere handful before the war to 191 by 1968, to the extent that no¶ self-respecting university could get by without a range of area studies¶ centres. Given the close intellectual connection between area studies¶ and national security problems it is no surprise to note that many of¶ these new institutes were funded via new foundations established for¶ that purpose by the CIA, such as the Asia Foundation, or through new¶ journals, such as the China Quarterly, originally established with a CIA¶ subvention. The Ford Foundation alone provided $270 million to thirty-four universities for area and language studies in the thirteen¶ year period from L953." As a way of presenting the new area studies¶ as highly innovative, involving interdisciplinary work against the¶ 'conservatism' of traditional departments and their disciplines, the¶ idea of 'behavioural science' came to the fore, pushed initially by¶ the National Security Act. The Ford Foundation even had its own¶ behavioural sciences division, which alone distributed $43 million in¶ the seven years following its inception in 1951, most of which was to¶ train more behaviouralists.77 'Behavioural science' was intended to¶ flag up a multidisciplinary and thus intellectually radical coalition of¶ sociologists, political scientists, psychologists and anthropologists,¶ being brought together in area studies. It was also meant to skirt¶ around any use of the word 'social', as in 'social sciences', which for¶ many connoted the idea of radical change embodied in the'social'of¶ 'socialism'. (It is worth noting that the same purported intellectual¶ radicalism behind such interdisciplinary work was strangely absent¶ when other academics came to suggest the introduction of 'studies'¶ which equally required interdisciplinary labour, such as 'Black studies';¶ the generosity towards interdisciplinary area studies was also hardly¶ forthcoming towards interdisciplinary Black studies.78)¶ Speaking at the School of Advanced International Studies at the¶ Johns Hopkins University in 1963, MeGeorge Bundy, originally of¶ Harvard's Center for International Affairs and later JFK's national¶ security advisor, spoke of the'curious fact'of academic history, namely¶ that 'in very large measure the area studies programs developed in¶ American universities in the years after the war were manned,¶ directed, or stimulated by graduates of the OSS', adding that 'there is¶ a high measure of interpenetration between universities with area¶ programs and the information-gathering agencies of the govern-¶ ment of the United States.79 Note: 'manned, directed, or stimulated by¶ graduates of the OSS'. Reeardless of the relative slowness in movine¶ into certain areas, it is still reasonable to say that the growth of area¶ studies'as a cross-disciplinary university enterprise grew out of the¶ interests and needs of the security services. As Robin Winks has¶ shown, area studies programmes in American universities came to¶ reflect the relative strengths of the area-related staffs in the national¶ security state. So the weakest for some time was Latin America and¶ the security agencies were slow to move into Near- and Middle-¶ L'astcrn studies/11 With no real epistemological position or even¶ method to speak of outside of a concern with 'security', area studies¶ simply became a means of gathering information of use to the¶ national security state. Because of this, pre-existing centres for the¶ study of a particular area had to be cither subsumed under the logic of¶ security or pushed aside. For example, although the security services¶ lacked real strength and intelligence in Latin American studies, they¶ nonetheless ignored the expertise in the independent Institute of¶ Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies under the leadership¶ of Rodney Hilton at Stanford, and shunned its monthly Hispanic¶ American Report. When Stanford was offered money to put together¶ a Latin American studies programme via a Ford Foundation grant¶ in 1963 and driven more explicitly by the demands of the national¶ security' state, the Report was suspended and the Hispanic Institute put¶ on'teaching only'duties/'¶ In stimulating and pursuing research in this way the national¶ security' state could shape the very concepts and methods to be used¶ in its exercise.82 Reflecting on his own experiences within area studies,¶ Bruce Cumings comments that¶ Countries inside the containment system, like Japan or South¶ Korea, and those outside it, like China or North Korea, were¶ clearly placed as friend or enemy, ally or adversary. In both¶ direct and indirect ways the U.S. government and the major¶ foundations traced these boundaries by directing scholarly¶ attention to distinct places and to distinct ways of understanding¶ them (for example, communist studies for North Korea and¶ China; modernization studies for Japan and South Korea), 'lb be¶ in 'Korean studies'or 'Chinese studies'was to daily experience the¶ tensions that afflicted Korea and China during the long period of¶ the Cold War.\*¶ Different concepts and discursive strategies were forged, giving rise¶ to two key tropes: on the one hand, 'Pacific Rim' a term helping¶ to transform a former enemy into a friend but also invoking a¶ community of the free, a huge historical forgetting, and a new-born¶ world to which anyone could belong so long as they committed¶ themselves wholeheartedly to the capitalist cause, transforming the¶ general sensibility concerning nations such as Japan through the¶ projection of more 'peaceable' philosophies such as Zen; on the other¶ hand/Red China' a nasty red blotch on the map\*' Where it wasn't¶ perpetuating a security-driven epistemology with categories such as¶ 'Pacific Rim', area studies reified yet other categories, such as'national¶ character' or 'national culture', and even created new objects of¶ analysis, such as the one based on an age old cartographer's fantasy¶ known as 'Asia'.85 None of this mattered so long as it worked as a¶ means of knowledge production and dissemination. The process of¶ naming as such was sufficient to give the thing enough substance¶ for the political work to be done: classification is a form of power, a¶ means of generating the categories which then shape perceptions of¶ the world.86¶ It is fair to say that to the extent that the American security state¶ shaped the field of area studies, it had a profound impact on the¶ intellectual research into those areas of the world seen to be com¶ munist or potentially so. But since this was a decidedly international¶ project, area studies was accompanied at an early stage by 'inter¶ national studies', incorporating international relations and languages¶ as well as what was coming to pass as strategic studies and what¶ would eventually emerge as security studies. The first significant¶ centre for international studies was Massachusetts Institute of¶ lechnology's Center for International Studies (CENIS), which during¶ its early years was underwritten by the CIA almost as a subsidiary¶ enterprise funded via the Ford Foundation. CENIS's roots lie in a¶ series of brainstorming sessions at MIT during 1950-1 involving¶ military and security elites and social scientists and focusing on the¶ problem of strategy and tactics for the Cold War, in particular¶ concerning how to defeat the Soviet jamming of the Voice of America.¶ The final report, delivered to the Secretary of State in February 1951,¶ noted that although the initial problem posed to them appeared to¶ be merely technical, 'the technical problem constitutes only one of a¶ collection of inseparable conditions'. The questions to ask were not¶ so much about technology and much more about psychology and¶ propaganda: 'What is the nature of the people to whom the United¶ States' messages are and ought to be directed? What ultimate effects¶ are to be desired? What sort of messages ought to be sent?'As such,¶ the final report made a range of recommendations concerning¶ propaganda and communications, issues to which I turn in detail¶ below. But one of its most influential recommendations concerned¶ the recruitment of competent researchers, for which it pointed to¶ universities as security resources, proposing a new kind of university¶ research institute which 'could cam' out government research pro-¶ grams in the field of political warfare utilizing university personnel'/7¶ This report from 'Project Troy' was, according to Allan Needle/crafted¶ to help cement lasting relations between American academics¶ (specifically, natural scientists, social scientists, and historians) and¶ the American foreign and intelligence bureaucracies',83 and led to the¶ creation of CENIS under the directorship of Max Millikan, who before¶ his appointment had been assistant to the director of the CIA.¶ Like area studies, then, the discipline of international studies was¶ also very much a product of the security project, developing in tandem¶ with area studies in general and Russian/Soviet studies in particular,¶ as CENIS became an archetype for government-sponsored imitators¶ at the universities of Washington, Illinois, Columbia, Princeton,¶ George Washington, Michigan, and dozens of others. Most were¶ 'manned, directed or stimulated' by members or former members of¶ the security services, and key texts to emerge from the centres were¶ often funded by the CIA. Walt Rostow's Dynamics of Soviet Society¶ (1953), for example, appeared in two versions, one classified for the¶ CIA and others within the political establishment, and one un-¶ classified for the public. Both versions had the same central thesis¶ that the Soviet Union was an imperialist power bent on world¶ domination and that the US had responsibility to fight this.The'public'¶ version eventually became a key textbook in the field, but makes no¶ mention of the backing or financing of the book/- But to make the¶ point more fully, however, requires an illustration of the major themes,¶ concepts and foci of the discipline, most obviously with the categories¶ of'development'and'modernisation'and the associated notion of the¶ Third World'.¶ 'Development' and 'modernisation' (interchangeable terms for¶ many) had a role in rearticulating knowledge about the Pacific Rim¶ and Red China, with one a prime example of successful development¶ and the other the prime example of failed development. But the real¶ achievement of these concepts was to shape the research agenda¶ for the Third World', part of the schema for dividing the globe¶ conceptually into three 'worlds' which emerged at this time.'\*0 The¶ Third World'was used to describe 'underdeveloped'or'pre modern'¶ nations as a group, but captures part of the insecurity surrounding the¶ 'Second World' of socialist nations. This helped to simultaneously¶ demarcate research on communism from area studies, only to bring¶ them together politically through the question of communist infil¶ tration and insurgency in the Third World. For in the schema, the Third¶ World was destined to become part of the First World - to modernise,¶ to develop unless thwarted from doing so and directed into an¶ alternative modernity by communism. The logic of the 'three worlds'¶ was thus always much more than describing different parts of the¶ planet. Rather, it was a key concept for thinking about the relationship¶ between the First and Second Worlds, with the Third World a key site¶ of capitalist communist confrontation. Thus in one sense the concept¶ of the Third World had nothing to do with relative poverty and¶ everything to do with absolute security: it was a term used to describe¶ non-aligned nations which could either become incorporated into the¶ order of international capital or become a security' threat. And given¶ how common the'three worlds'model became, to the extent that its¶ meaning was thought to be both self-evident and unmistakable, it is¶ safe to say that whole swathes of social science research were shaped¶ by this problematic/"¶ The key to this problematic of'developing', 'modernising' the Third¶ World into the First rather than the Second was identified in a set of¶ 'Pentagon'lalks'in 1947 in which American and British officials agreed¶ on the need to stem widespread discontent in Africa and the Middle¶ East by improving living standards there, and was then pursued¶ by Truman in his 1949 inauguration speech in which he identified¶ 'underdeveloped areas' as central to the unfolding security strategy.¶ Building on such prompts the CIA through the Social Science¶ Research Council and the Ford Foundation funded Rostow and others¶ to provide an anti Communist grand narrative of history around¶ which a security strategy for the Third World' could be built. This¶ narrative was modernisation theory and the concept of development:¶ the belief that 'underdeveloped' areas suffered from a fundamental¶ lack, a fundamental incapacity which might be exploited as a political¶ weakness by communism. Their 'development' or 'modernisation' was¶ to be their salvation and, concomitantly, was to be the First World's¶ security. In one of the key texts of this new discipline, Daniel Lerner¶ comments that where once the talk had been of 'Europeanisation',¶ and then 'Americanisation' and so to'Westernisation', Europe, America¶ and the West now offer an even broader notion: modernisation. Yet¶ this modernity is in conflict with an alternative: the modernity of com-¶ munism.97 At the same time, Lerner astutely noted that whereas some¶ political leaders found it easy to denounce the West, denouncing¶ 'modernisation' was a much harder trick to pull off. Who could be¶ against development, other than primitives and traditionalists?93¶ 'Modernisation'/'dcvelopment' studies, and the politics implicit¶ within them concerning the superiority of America/Europe/the West¶ in general and the nation state and capital as the political forms¶ of modernity, quickly became a key metanarrative surrounding the¶ notion of security. And since this narrative incorporated an economic¶ dimension, in the shift from subsistence economies to industrial¶ sation (a.k.a.'growth'); a political dimension, in the shift from authori-¶ tarian and tradition bound systems to democratic and participator}'¶ systems; a social dimension, in the notion of a rise of individualism¶ and social mobility; and a socio religious dimension, in the notion of a¶ shift towards secularisation, so the model had broad interdisciplinary¶ appeal. Thus the work of Rostow on the Soviet Union, Gabriel¶ Almond on psychological warfare, Harold Lasswcll on public opinion,¶ and Daniel Lerner on postwar Europe could provide both information¶ and legitimisation for the security project being meted out across the¶ globe, while the more overt attacks on the radicalism of Third World¶ intellectuals put forward by Edward Shils and James Burnham could¶ also offer a suitable level of polemical and rhetorical support.9'" And¶ social scientists more generally were drawn in increasingly large¶ numbers to the new field, for just as it didn't matter that the key¶ intellectuals in Harvard's Russian Research Center had no prior¶ knowledge of Russia, so it was equally unimportant that social¶ scientists working in development studies also had little knowledge¶ of the places that were said to need 'developing' the key issue was¶ less the Third World' itself and much more a commitment to the¶ broad model of change and security implicit in the development/¶ modernisation idea.¶ Since the key issue was how to prevent the Third World from¶ 'falling' towards communism (from being 'failed states' avant la lettre),¶ academics taken with this idea came to focus on the mechanisms for¶ integrating these nations into the system of global capital, and to thus¶ entrench capital into those same nations (socially and culturally as¶ well as economically), a refinement of eighteenth-century liberal¶ internationalism coordinated to the needs of the postwar international¶ trading system established by the national security state and global¶ capital.95 The nature of the project is apparent from the sidelining of¶ key radical thinkers in the field such as Gunnar Myrdal, Paul Baran or¶ Barrington Moore Jr., but is perhaps most obvious in the body of¶ economic theory that grew up around these ideas, which reproduces¶ faithfully the liberal imperialist assumption that 'developed' countries¶ are in no way responsible for 'underdevelopment', says nothing about¶ capitalist exploitation, and repeats the injunction that all countries¶ work together towards 'social harmony7\* This does not mean that¶ change was to be prevented. Rather, the question was the way in¶ which change was to come about and the political direction or¶ nature of the change. As an alternative to the revolutionary praxis of¶ Marxism, development studies offered a version of Social Darwinism¶ reworked through a structural-functionalist lens: identifying 'the¶ requirements for modernisation' means 'defining social evolution in¶ institutional terms'.\*7 This is apparent from Rostow's Stages of Economic¶ Growth. Subtitled A Non-Communist Manifesto, the book treats the¶ economic field as essentially biological and so offers a non-Marxist¶ materialism, arguing for the Third World to be allowed 'to enjoy the¶ blessings and choices opened up by the march of compound interest'¶ and mass consumption rather than the unmitigated misery of¶ universal human freedom.\* Moreover, in thinking about'development'¶ in these ways, development studies could then reinforce that fetish of¶ area studies, the national model. As Harry Harootunian puts it,¶ 'what eventually would be offered as both a representation of and¶ a prescription for development was an evolutionary model of¶ growth, against a putativcly revolutionary one that, if followed, would¶ promise the realization of the peaceful development of capitalism'.99¶ 'Development' thus constituted an evolutionary' adaptation to capital,¶ reconfigured as 'modernisation'. At the same moment that western¶ modernity was being restructured in all its capitalist glory, the'under-¶ developed' world was formed as a new deployment of power for the¶ security of liberal order-building.¶ We can trace this from a report written by members of staff at¶ CENIS and backtrack from there. Written under the direction of¶ Max Millikan, and involving Daniel Lemer, Walt Kostow and Lucian¶ Pye, the report was presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign¶ Relations in January 1960. Called 'Economic, Social, and Political¶ Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implications for¶ United States Policy', the report was published the following year as¶ The Emerging Nations.130 As a means of understanding social change in¶ colonial societies, the report offered a classification of the Third World¶ in terms of'traditional societies'/modern oligarchies'and 'potentially¶ democratic'formations. Each of these felt the pressures generated by¶ the push to modernisation, since 'virtually all individuals everywhere¶ want some of the fruits of modernization'.101 These 'fruits' lay in¶ economic development, which was in turn thought to be the condition¶ of democratisation. But the key question was how to maintain stability¶ and order in the context of development, for such instability leads to¶ guerilla operations and encourages people 'to accept in desperation¶ the unity and discipline that Communist and other totalitarian forms¶ of social organization hold out to them'.107 Here development studies¶ leant intellectual weight to counter-insurgency practices: since the¶ rationality of capitalist modernity was taken as read, so the necessity¶ and rationality of eliminating oppositionist movements needed to be¶ explained and justified. Counter-insurgency practices carried out by¶ military elites and newly emerging security forces were thought to¶ be crucial to maintaining order and authority under the process of¶ modernisation and development. The report thereby articulated a set¶ of views that had emerged from CENIS, facilitated by the security¶ elites, and which then filtered through other developing centres for¶ international studies, helping to create a de facto agenda for develop-¶ ment studies in which the conjunction of national security and¶ economic order were integrally connected to intellectual, political¶ and cultural understandings of America's place in the world and its¶ modernising mission.10' Indeed, a major text in the literature edited¶ by Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman concluded that 'Anglo-¶ American qualities most closely approximate the model of the modern¶ political system'.104¶ These general ideas permeated the more specific texts within the¶ disciplines. For example, Lerner's Hie Passing of a Traditional Society:¶ Modernizing the Middle East, published in 1958 following research¶ conducted since 1950 under joint sponsorship by CENIS and the¶ Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR) at Columbia, became a¶ hugely influential text. In it Lerner suggested that while in Turkey and¶ Lebanon modernisation and stability and tended to go together, in¶ countries such as Iran and Syria this had not been the case. While¶ lurkey and Lebanon were 'democratising', Iran and Syria were¶ 'bolshevising'. In frustrating the course of modernisation by cul-¶ tivating political 'extremism', the 'bolshevising' tendencies were said to¶ act as a block on the 'right'form of political development, the direction¶ and tempo of which was meant to be overseen by a new elite com¶ mitted to modernisation.¶ In conforming to US policy in particular and the bourgeois¶ conception of development in general, it is not difficult to see what¶ took place more as'underdevelopment'or'maldevelopment', a direct¶ result of pursuing US security interests at the expense of genuine¶ improvements in people's lives and standards of living, carrying with it¶ brutal violence in the form of countcrinsurgcncy and destabilisation,¶ again organised by 'First World' security agencies for the benefit of¶ international capital. ' This gave radical new lire to the idea of'police'¶ and'military assistance', which increasingly allowed states to exercise¶ violence in the name of development: 'police' and 'military7 assistance¶ were thought necessary as counters to the insurgencies generated by¶ the struggles over the modernisation process, but were to be offered¶ only to those nations'developing'in the appropriate ways.,LX"Dcvelop¶ ment' thus became a means of extending 'security', while 'security¶ measures' became necessary due to the upheavals and resistance¶ caused by development. Security intellectuals working in this field¶ were deeply complicit in this process, providing the key information¶ for the security agencies, legitimising the system, and peddling the key¶ notions and concepts used in a range of books and reports. Contrary¶ to recent accounts trying to 'humanise' security by merging it with¶ development, ' development and security have always been merged;¶ indeed, development is a security concept.¶ Out of the question of how to maintain political order in the context¶ of modernisation, elite formation and political culture came to the¶ fore. Because 'modernity is a style of life' as well as an economic¶ project the crux of the matter was hcno one might move from¶ traditional ways towards modern life styles. \* The focus on political¶ culture naturally meant a focus on the main forms of cultural trans-¶ mission and, in particular, the practices of participation. Lerner¶ suggests that whereas traditional society is non-participant, modern¶ society involves a culture of participation: formal schooling, reading¶ newspapers, expressing an opinion, changing jobs, voting in elections¶ of competing candidates.109 This is clear from the defining text on¶ political culture, Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture (1963). This¶ book is now regarded as a classic of comparative politics and for¶ putting the concept of political culture onto the map of political¶ science. But it should in fact be read as a contribution to the American¶ national security state, for which Gabriel Almond served: its central¶ argument is congruent with the strategy being employed by the¶ national security state, in which the whole machinery of government¶ in 'developing' states, including 'the people' themselves, was found¶ wanting compared to those of liberal democracies, and which there¶ fore needed the winning of hearts and minds through a psycho-¶ cultural security project.110 In their book Almond and Verba state that¶ 'new world political culture will be a political culture of participation',¶ which they take to mean'the belief that the ordinary man is politically¶ relevant' (the ordinary woman presumably not expected to enjoy the¶ same level of participation or relevance). The term'belief is important¶ here, since the authors accept that much of the argument about¶ participation is based on the myth of participation: that citizens see¶ themselves as potentially active. Indeed, actual participation is not¶ really desirable for good order, since participation was more often than¶ not a cause for concern: the ideal order is one in which'the ordinary¶ citizen be relatively passive, uninvolved, and deferential'.' The ideal¶ citizen is a docile body. The other side of this argument is that the¶ passive, uninvolved and deferential citizen be led by 'modernising¶ elites' who by definition possess 'modern' habits and characteristics.¶ 'Modernisation' was in this way part of the battle over identity dis-¶ cussed in the previous chapter, one in which the security intellectuals¶ were more than willing to take sides armed with classically liberal¶ notions of individuality, rationality and the standard justifications for¶ the severe inequalities between nations. At the same time, modern-¶ isation theory also coincided with some of the main assumptions of¶ elite theory.The real issue, however, is that since the participator)' state¶ can be either democratic or totalitarian, the project is to ensure that¶ only one of these wins out - or, to put it another way, to ensure that¶ one of the myths is more successful.1" 'In American Cold War-era¶ scholarship on political culture', notes Ida Oren, 'the boundaries¶ between the study of political culture and the politics of U.S. foreign¶ policy were porous at best'.113 In fact, what emerges from the academic¶ study of political culture is an argument for extending the security¶ project into the Third World, a reinforcement of the prevailing¶ economic and political orthodox)' around capital, and thus an apology¶ for counterinsurgency tactics, all dressed up in the garb of'compara-¶ tive politics'.114¶ Almond and Verba suggest that ensuring the victory of the demo¶ cratic myth - of any myth - means ensuring that leaders in developing¶ nations use the right psychological and cultural tactics. Shifting the¶ focus of discussion onto questions of psychology in this way involves¶ an important ideological shift of the focus away from questions of the¶ process or underlying structural issues of socioeconomic change to¶ one of the actors involved and the cultures in which thev are¶ immersed."' This simultaneously reinforces a set of arguments within¶ international studies about mass psychology and communications. For¶ Almond and Verba (the former having served as external consultant to¶ the Psychological Strategy Board) the central feature of political¶ culture is 'psychological orientation toward social objects'.116 As well as¶ playing on dubious claims about 'national character' which Almond¶ had developed in his book The American People and the Foreign Policy¶ (in which he sought to assess the 'psychological potential' of the¶ American people in the struggle for world leadership),1 ' this argu¶ ment overlaps nicely with modernisation theory: in Rostow's argu¶ ment, cultivating the appropriate psychological outlook is a way for¶ societies to be jolted into modernisation. In the final chapter of The¶ Stages of Economic Grmvth, on'Marxism, Communism, and the Stages¶ of-Growth', the fundamental difference between the Communist¶ and non-Communist analyses is said to lie in the view of human¶ motivation. Marx's analyses fail to explain historical transformation¶ because they fail to grasp human motivation and psychology.11\*¶ Arguments such as these made questions of psychology a security¶ issue. Ellen Herman notes that many psychologists in the early Cold¶ War thought that there was little point in assisting abstractions like¶ 'developing societies'. But 'personalities', on the other hand, were¶ concrete entities, and concrete entities about which psychology¶ claimed to know.Thus psychologists were increasingly used within the¶ intellectual programmes generated bv the national security state,¶ Herman writes that the concept of political culture thereby injected¶ a new appreciation for psychology into the study of comparative¶ politics, though we might just as easily say that psychology's¶ politicisation came via its incorporation into the disciplinary shifts¶ registered by the rhetoric of national security."9¶ Part of the point about the discussion of the 'psychological¶ orientation' of individuals within the political culture is that their¶ 'personalities' could be shaped through political intervention. One of¶ the 'appeals of communism', as Gabriel Almond argued in a book¶ with that title, lay in the personal deviance and psychological¶ maladjustment on the part of social misfits, expressed in social forms¶ of resentment, alcoholism and, as we saw in the previous chapter,¶ sexual promiscuity."0 This needed psychological work on the part of¶ elites, in yet another attempt at the conduct of conduct. In an essay on¶ 'Political Culture and Political Development'Lucian Pye suggested that¶ 'the concept of political culture assumes that each individual must,¶ in his own historical context, learn and appropriate into his own¶ personality the knowledge and feelings about the politics of his¶ people and his community. This means in turn that the political¶ culture of a society is limited but given firm structure by the factors¶ basic to dynamic psychology'.121 For other contributors to the book,¶ psychological orientation towards ones political culture was a form of¶ national identity: a sense of belonging, a form of patriotism, and thus¶ the foundation of loyalty. According to Verba, for example, 'the¶ question of national identity is the political culture version of the basic¶ problem of self identity, whereby physical and legal membership of a¶ system should coincide with psychological membership. As well as¶ legitimising the activities of national elites, this psycho-political affect¶ also perpetuates feelings of loyalty among the members.1"¶ This helped develop the discipline of mass communication', since it¶ was widely assumed that modernisation involved not just industrial¶ isation, secularisation and urbanisation, but also a well-developed¶ communications system. Lerner's argument, for example, was that¶ in certain developing societies, 'psychological participation' through¶ opinion was spreading before genuine economic and political par-¶ ticipation, creating a mass of people relatively well informed through¶ the mass media but politically disenfranchised and economically¶ struggling, and therefore susceptible to communist insurgents.1?J To¶ control this situation required elite management of the media and¶ communications systems. This reinforced the importance of 'com¶ munications research' in the field of international studies and¶ facilitated the rise of 'mass communications research' as a distinct¶ disciplinary activity. Lerner's book therefore became and remained a¶ foundational text in communication studies as well as development¶ theory.¶ Christopher Simpson has shown how'mass communications' has¶ its origins in 'psychological operations' used in World War Two and¶ then further intensified with a multi-million-dollar bureaucracy for¶ conducting clandestine psychological warfare during the Cold War.¶ NSC 4 (December 1947) established measures for 'the immediate¶ strengthening and coordination of all foreign information measures¶ . . . to counteract effects of anti-U.S. propaganda', following which¶ emerged funding for the Voice of America, scholarly exchange pro-¶ grammes, cultural centres abroad, and other means of propaganda.¶ NSC 4-A, a 'top secret'document issued on the same day as NSC 4,¶ was even more explicit about the necessity for covert psychological¶ operations along with the overt ones encouraged by NSC 4.124 The¶ psychological operations programme was then expanded in March¶ 1949 with NSC-43, again a year later with NSC-59 (March 1950),¶ and then again with NSC 129/1 (April 1952). The language around¶ 'psychological warfare' and even the term itself - involved a multi¶ layered, euphemistic and often contradictory terminology 'that per-¶ mitted those who had been initiated into the arcana of national¶ security to discuss psychological operations and clandestine warfare¶ in varying degrees of specificity depending on the audience, while¶ simultaneously denying the very existence of these projects when it¶ was politically convenient to do so'.125 I^rt of this euphemism and¶ fudging lay in the very term 'mass communications research' itself,¶ which sounds less underhand than'propaganda'and less violent than¶ 'psychological warfare'. Sounds, in fact, like an academic discipline.¶ To this end the security services, military intelligence and propa-¶ ganda agencies helped bankroll all the large scale communications¶ research projects by US scholars, including the research into tech-¶ niques of persuasion, opinion measurement, interrogation, political¶ and military mobilisation and the propagation of ideology. At least six¶ of the most important centres of communication studies, including the¶ Survey Research Center (SRC, later to become the Institute for Social¶ Research) at the University of Michigan, I3ASR at Columbia, and¶ CENIS, developed as de facto adjuncts of government psychological¶ warfare programmes, with the US allocating between $7 million and¶ $13 million annually for university and think-tank studies into com-¶ munications. The reliance of such centres on psychological warfare¶ money 'was so extensive as to suggest that the crystallisation of mass¶ communications studies into a distinct scholarly field might not have¶ come about during the 1950s without substantial military, CIA, and¶ USIA [US Information Agency] intervention'.1^¶ The point, again, is not about contacts and money per se; nor is it¶ about the use of the discipline of communication studies. Rather it is¶ that the discipline was actively constructed by the national security¶ state. If the critical point of leverage in intellectual work lies in the¶ formation of agendas, models, perspectives and concepts, then the¶ extent to which this discipline was shaped by the logic of security¶ becomes clear, 'lake for example the key journal and key textbook in¶ the field, Public Opinion Quarterly (POQ) and The Process and Effects of¶ Mass Communication (1954), edited by Walter Schramm. The editors¶ of and main contributors to POQ all had close links to the security¶ services, with many dependent on such government funding for¶ their livelihood. Simpson shows that between 1945 and 1955 the case¶ studies, research reports and polemics in POQ were all in favour of¶ expanded psychological operations, with the journal publishing¶ articles that tended to reinforce the official US position on relations¶ with the Soviet Union, the 1948 election in Italy, and the Middle East.¶ The journal offered repeated publication, editorial slots, book excerpts¶ and book reviews to those working in the new field, such as Daniel¶ Lerner, W. Phillips Davison and Harold Lasswell. POQ thus managed¶ to articulate and defend particular preconceptions about mass¶ communication. To give just one example, a special issue of POQ on¶ 'International Communications Research'in 1952 contained essavs on¶ psychological policy, the international impact of Voice of America,¶ resistance to propaganda, the comparative study of communications,¶ and some case studies of techniques and countries. Many of the essays,¶ such as Charles Y. Clock's 'Comparative Study of Communications¶ and Opinion Formation', were underwritten by the Department of¶ State (and virtually all US research into 'national communication¶ systems' during the decade that followed was underwritten by the¶ Department of State or the military). They helped forge the idea of¶ 'national communication systems' and implied that propaganda and¶ communication management are characteristic of all states. While¶ suggesting that what was different was the degree or style of control,¶ this normalised the concept being articulated. At the same time, the¶ journal marginalised those it saw as 'outside' the discipline, those¶ critical theorists and others who wrote with more radical views about¶ the topic of communication: POQ had no space for articles by or on¶ critical theorists working on themes concerning mass communication,¶ such as Adorno, Horkheimer or C. Wright Mills, and ridiculed any¶ widely read critical work on the subject, such as Vance Packard's The¶ tiidden Persuaders.177¶ Schramm's book, said by some to be the springboard for the launch¶ of communications research as an autonomous academic discipline,128¶ replicated and reinforced this tendency. Schramm founded the first¶ independent Department of Communications at Iowa and in 1947¶ established the Institute of Communications Research at the Univcr¶ sity of Illinois, which formed the basis of the first doctoral programme¶ in mass communications.129 Many of the essays in the book had state¶ backing, which the book nowhere mentions. Nor does it mention the¶ tact that the book was prepared originally as training material for US¶ propaganda programmes. More important is the way that the book¶ helped forge a key set of agreed concepts for the discipline, such as¶ the idea of a 'national communications system', the 'opinion leader',¶ 'reference groups', and the distinction between 'elite' and 'mass'¶ audiences. Schramm's own work had already placed the idea of¶ 'personal influence'on the research agenda of the discipline.¶ Schramm's research on Korea, funded by USIA and published as a¶ commercial book co-written with John Riley, called The Reds Take¶ a City: Tfie Communist Occupation of Seoul, ivith Eyezoitness Accounts¶ (1951), translated into twelve languages and distributed throughout¶ the world by the US Information Service, had led him to argue that¶ the effect of communications messages was more a function of the¶ psychological and social status of the recipient rather than the¶ message itself. The real test of this, he believed, was the effect of¶ communications in a 'Soviet' society, such as Korea. (It didn't seem¶ to matter that Korea was not a 'Soviet' society.) Through this test¶ Schramm came to distinguish between 'authoritarian' and 'Soviet¶ totalitarian'communication systems, with the latter reducible to three¶ basic elements: monopoly, concentration, and reinforcement. From¶ this Schramm could argue that authoritarian but anti communist¶ states are inherently better than communist states because of the¶ structure of their communication systems - one is more'free'than the¶ other.133 At the same time, however, he also argued that Soviet experts¶ were aware of the limits of persuasion through the national com¶ munication system and so employed'personal influence'via respected¶ members of a person's social network and 'face-to-face indoctrination'¶ via 'opinion leaders'. And so the concept of 'personal influence'¶ became a dominant paradigm in media sociology.131 This then re-¶ inforced assumptions about the inevitability and appropriateness of¶ elite control of mass communication, especially in 'managing' the¶ modernisation process/winning' targeted audiences and, by distorting¶ unauthorised communication, helping ensure that indigenous radical¶ and democratic movements did not achieve their goals. This helped¶ effect a highly convenient shift in language as, for example/deception'¶ could be recast as'perception management'. Beyond communication¶ research this paradigm was one in which the purported 'study' of¶ power by social scientists was in fact a rationalisation of that¶ power, in which all that mattered was to improve its efficiency and¶ effectiveness.:3:¶ 1 have been arguing, then, that the ideology of security shaped a¶ whole tranche of academic work within the social sciences, which¶ then reinforced the very project being undertaken in the name of¶ security, to the extent that dominant paradigms within the social¶ sciences concerning development, modernisation, mass communi¶ cation and political culture were in fact part and parcel of the paradigm¶ of domination, as Simpson puts it. This is not to say that every scholar¶ in these disciplines was some kind of political lackey - the US state's¶ role in Vietnam came under fire from some Southeast Asia specialists,¶ its policy concerning Pakistan came under fire from some within¶ South Asian studies, its role in Latin America came under fire from¶ some of those working in Latin American studies, and the same can¶ be said for its role in Middle Fast politics.133 My point, rather, is that¶ most of the major and many of the minor concepts used within the¶ disciplines I have been discussing were shaped by a political project¶ that under its broadest label could be called the search for security. Far¶ from being autonomous disciplines, never mind ones founded with a¶ critical political edge, these disciplines were central to the ideological¶ growth of the logic of security, part of the discursive economy built up¶ to project the logic of security across the face of the globe. They¶ became crucial capillaries for the dissemination and articulation of¶ the meaning, production and spread of a certain kind of knowledge¶ oriented around the idea of security, and their key thinkers became¶ the'organic intellectuals'of the security state, accepting, parroting and¶ legitimising the official security policy of the hegemonic power, the¶ political economy of security, and the logic of security as a whole. They¶ were well equipped to serve in this way because their categories of¶ analysis, particularly their conceptions of power, knowledge and order¶ were no different from those found in the political rhetoric of the state¶ itself.¶ This was parallelled in shifts in other more established disciplines,¶ which were encouraged to rethink their approaches and assumptions.¶ In economics, game theory, linear programming and mathematical¶ approaches came to dominate the field as the national security state¶ made available large amounts of research funding to those willing to¶ work in these areas, due to their focus on conflict and decision¶ making within the context of constrained maximums or minimums.¶ The same is true of rational choice theory, which came to dominate¶ political science.1" And anthropological research was also reshaped¶ in ways of interest to the national security state.155 But the security¶ intellectuals were to find their real home in that newest of new¶ disciplines:'security studies'.¶ Security studies became a decisive field in western intellectual¶ labour with the birth and growth of the security state. A whole¶ profession devoted to 'security7 quickly emerged, initially as a¶ subdiscipline of International Relations (with its own supine relation¶ to the state)1>? and gradually in its own right in the university - and¶ now in the twenty-first century the growth discipline par excellence.¶ Security studies, like its sister discipline strategic studies, emerged as¶ part of the discursive economy built up around a politics driven by the¶ logic of security and dominated by the concerns of the hegemonic¶ powers. Existing from its birth as far as could be imagined from the¶ idea of critique, security studies easily adopted some of the key¶ categories of imperial confrontation, especially those which over-¶ lapped with international and area studies, such as'deterrence'.'Most¶ academics in national security studies were concerned with various¶ issues of deterrence broadly conceived' reports Deborah Welch¶ Larson, 'such as the development of strategies to deter Soviet aggros¶ sion'.157 As such it became an important factor in the dissemination¶ and articulation of security concerns on the part of such powers, not¶ least because its central categories and key conceptions of power,¶ subjectivity and knowledge were no different from those of the¶ rhetoric of hegemonic powers themselves. In its fetish for security¶ and the state, and the geopolitical project being carried out in their¶ name, security studies quickly came to act as a'celebratory' enterprise,¶ valorising liberal values, institutions and political economy and en-¶ trenched in a defence of a distinct historical and cultural achievement,¶ sometimes known as 'the West' but better understood as capitalist¶ modernity.133 Its central presumption, that the state provides the¶ legitimate framework for negotiating the insecurities of the modern¶ world and capital the basis for this negotiation, makes less sense than¶ it ever did.¶ Anyone well versed in history or with experience of university life¶ will know about the shameful ways in which large numbers of¶ academics have elevated venality into the cardinal academic virtue,¶ complying with the demands of those in power and the wishes of¶ those with money: witness the political scientists, historians, anthro-¶ pologists, geographers, cartographers, sociologists, linguists and many¶ others who reworked their disciplines according to the principles and¶ myths, and the principle myths, of fascism.13'' 'Academic life under¶ fascism', notes Christopher Button, 'is a dismal . . . episode in an¶ unedifying story of relations between the modern academic and the¶ state, and between academics and power both within and outside the¶ university'.143 But this part of the history of fascism is merely the worst¶ moment in the wider and equally unedifying story of relations¶ between academics and the state more generally, merely one way in¶ which intellectuals have kowtowed to the principles and myths, and¶ the principle myths, concerning security and the state. Spouting¶ the jargon of security and enthralled by the trappings of power, their¶ intellectual labour consists of nothing less than attempts to write hand-¶ books for the princes of the new security state. The death of countless¶ numbers in a more'efficient'bombing of a city, the stationing of troops¶ halfway around the world in order to bring to an end any attempt at¶ collective self-determination, the use of military machines against¶ civilians, the training of police forces in counter insurgency practices,¶ but more than anything the key concepts and categories used to¶ explain and justify these things all defended, supported and even¶ 'improved' by security intellectuals for whom, ultimately, intellectual¶ labour boils down to little more than the question of the most efficient¶ manner in which to achieve the security demanded by the state and¶ bourgeois order. In rationalising the political and corporate logic of¶ security, the security intellectual conceals the utter irrationality of the¶ system as a whole. The security intellectual, then, is nothing less than¶ the security ideologue, peddling the fetish of our time.¶ The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to¶ eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically¶ loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than¶ the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That¶ is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of¶ bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by¶ the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration¶ of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear,¶ anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it¶ is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to¶ consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.¶ This impasse exists because security has now become so all eneom¶ passing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive¶ conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The con-¶ stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end as the¶ political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful¶ sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can¶ be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from¶ such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people¶ might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might¶ transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics¶ simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing¶ it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political¶ questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve¶ 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be¶ told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in¶ this sense, an anti politics,"1 dominating political discourse in much¶ the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human¶ beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character¶ of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get¶ beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way¶ that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state¶ intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.¶ Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael¶ Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in¶ which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the¶ hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe¶ there is no hole.14? The mistake has been to think that there is a hole¶ and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision¶ of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or¶ humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain¶ within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re¶ affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of¶ security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another¶ vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language¶ which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and¶ which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the¶ state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political¶ language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while¶ much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the¶ tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as¶ the positive in setting thought on new paths.¶ For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society¶ and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on¶ about insecurity and to keep demanding'more security'(while meekly¶ hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to¶ blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the¶ authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves¶ against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating¶ effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political¶ issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the¶ power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the¶ short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also¶ allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different con¶ ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about¶ social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would¶ perhaps be emancipators' in the true sense of the word. What this¶ might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly¶ requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is¶ an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as¶ solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human¶ condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security¶ and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and¶ 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that¶ 'securiti/ing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but¶ bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave¶ enough to return the gift.'43

### 1NC

#### Interpretation –

#### Armed forces only includes United States troops – explicitly excludes weapons systems

Lorber 13 (Eric, JD U of Penn Law School, Phd Duke U, Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol 15: 3 "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?")

As is evident from a textual analysis,177 an examination of the legislative history,178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act,179 “armed forces” refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define “armed forces,” but it states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government.”180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase “introduction of armed forces,” the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term “member” connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.181 Thus, it appears that the term “armed forces” means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces.”182 By using inclusionary—as opposed to exclusionary— language, one might argue that the term “armed forces” could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non- members constituting armed forces).183 Second, the term “member” does not explicitly reference “humans,” and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that “armed forces” refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized “armed forces” as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term “armed forces” revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution’s architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central Intelligence Agency).184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback,185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of “armed forces” centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones,186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized “armed forces” to mean U.S. combat troops.

#### - Hostilities require troops

Mataconis 2011 [Doug Mataconis June 15, 2011 “President Obama To Congress: War Powers Act Doesn’t Apply To Libya” http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/president-obama-to-congress-war-powers-act-doesnt-apply-to-libya/]

The question then is whether United States military forces are still involved in “hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” There seems to be no real contention by anyone that American forces, or NATO forces for that matter, are actually on Libyan territory or in Libyan territorial waters. The Administration seems to be arguing that since there are no American ground troops and no American fighter planes involved in action over Libya, then the answer to that question is no. As John Cole notes, though, we are using Predator drones to launch missiles at Libyan target on an as-needed basis, so the idea that we’re completely off the grid on this mission isn’t entirely true.¶ However, is an unmanned drone controlled from hundreds, or thousands, miles away really “engaging in hostilities” within the meaning of the War Powers Act? What about launching cruise missiles from a ship in international waters, would that be outside the purview of the WPA as well? Heck, would launching an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile from a silo in North Dakota toward Tripoli be covered by the Act? The answer is unclear:¶ It remains to be seen whether majorities in Congress will accept the administration’s argument, defusing the confrontation, or whether the White House’s response will instead fuel greater criticism. Either way, because the War Powers Resolution does not include a definition of “hostilities” and the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, the legal debate is likely to be resolved politically, said Rick Pildes, a New York University law professor.¶ “There is no clear legal answer,” he said. “The president is taking a position, so the question is whether Congress accepts that position, or doesn’t accept that position and wants to insist that the operation can’t continue without affirmative authorization from Congress.”

#### Violation – the affirmative prevents the introduction of a type of weapon into the battlefield which doesn’t quality as armed forces or hostilities.

#### Prefer our interp – limits outweigh they blow the lid off the resolution allowing hundreds of small weapons affs and affs that restrict parts of the nuclear triad. They crush negative ground by removing generic links to core topic DAs. The aff would always get more specific link turns to topic DAs and mechanism counter-plans.

### Strikes

#### No Iran Strikes – Washington pressure, public backlash

Kershner ‘13 [ISABEL KERSHNER, “Israeli Official Hints Pentagon Plans May Make Lone Strike on Iran Unnecessary”, New York Times, January 26, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/world/middleeast/defense-official-hints-that-israel-is-stepping-back-from-plans-to-unilaterally-attack-iran.html>, am]

Herbert Krosney, an American-Israeli analyst and the author of a book about the arming of Iran and Iraq, said Mr. Barak’s statement now “indicates that there is close cooperation” between Israel and the United States following months of tension between the country’s leaders (though military and intelligence services continued to work together closely).¶ “I think there is a realization in Israel that it would be extremely difficult for Israel to operate alone,” he said.¶ Last year, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel was pushing hard for the Obama administration to set clear “red lines” on Iran’s nuclear progress that would prompt the United States to undertake a military strike, infuriating the administration. And Mr. Barak repeatedly warned that because of Israel’s more limited military capabilities, its own window of opportunity to carry out an effective strike was closing.¶ It has appeared that Mr. Barak has drifted away from Mr. Netanyahu in recent months, sounding more conciliatory toward the Obama administration, but even the prime minister has become less antagonistic.¶ The Pentagon declined to comment on The Daily Beast report, but a senior defense official said, “The U.S. military constantly plans for a range of contingencies we might face around the world, and our planning is often quite detailed.” The official added, “That shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone.”¶ In recent years, Mr. Barak and Mr. Netanyahu had become increasingly alarmed as Iran moved forward with a nuclear program that it says is solely for peaceful purposes, but that Israel, the United States and others believe is geared toward producing a bomb. The two men consistently emphasized Israel’s doctrine of self-reliance for such existential issues.¶ But faced with tough opposition from Washington and public criticism from a string of former Israeli security chiefs, the prospect of an imminent unilateral Israeli strike receded in recent months.

#### No Israeli attack- we cite research- just blustering

Rubin ‘12 (Barry Rubin, Professor at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel, the Director of the Global Research and International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, and a Senior Fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, “Israel Isn’t Going to Attack Iran and Neither Will the United States.” <http://pjmedia.com/barryrubin/2012/01/26/israel-is-not-about-to-attack-iran-and-neither-is-the-united-states-get-used-to-it/>, 2012)

The radio superhero The Shadow had the power to “cloud men’s minds.” But nothing clouds men’s minds like anything that has to do with Jews or Israel. This year’s variation on that theme is the idea that Israel is about to attack Iran. Such a claim repeatedly appears in the media. Some have criticized Israel for attacking Iran and turning the Middle East into a cauldron of turmoil (not as if the region needs any help in that department) despite the fact that it hasn’t even happened. On the surface, of course, there is apparent evidence for such a thesis. Israel has talked about attacking Iran and one can make a case for such an operation. Yet any serious consideration of this scenario — based on actual research and real analysis rather than what the uninformed assemble in their own heads or Israeli leaders sending a message to create a situation where an attack isn’t necessary — is this: It isn’t going to happen. Indeed, the main leak from the Israeli government, by an ex-intelligence official who hates Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been that the Israeli government already decided not to attack Iran. He says that he worries this might change in the future but there’s no hint that this has happened or will happen. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has publicly denied plans for an imminent attack as have other senior government officials. Of course, one might joke that the fact that Israeli leaders talk about attacking Iran is the biggest proof that they aren’t about to do it. But Israel, like other countries, should be subject to rational analysis. Articles written by others are being spun as saying Israel is going to attack when that’s not what they are saying. I stand by my analysis and before December 31 we will see who was right. I’m not at all worried about stating very clearly that Israel is not going to go to war with Iran. So why are Israelis talking about a potential attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities? Because that’s a good way – indeed, the only way Israel has — to pressure Western countries to work harder on the issue, to increase sanctions and diplomatic efforts. If one believes that somehow pushing Tehran into slowing down or stopping its nuclear weapons drive is the only alternative to war, that greatly concentrates policymakers’ minds. Personally, I don’t participate — consciously or as an instrument — in disinformation campaigns, even if they are for a good cause. Regarding Ronen Bergman’s article in the New York Times, I think the answer is simple: Israeli leaders are not announcing that they are about to attack Iran. They are sending a message that the United States and Europe should act more decisively so that Israel does not feel the need to attack Iran in the future. That is a debate that can be held but it does not deal with a different issue: Is Israel about to attack Iran? The answer is “no.”

### Prolif

**No impact to Iran prolif – their ev is biased** – rationality, nuclear deterrence and defense posture check escalation

**Waltz 12** – Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (Kenneth N., Jul/Aug, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” EBSCO)

UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear. Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move. Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945. History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold.

#### No Middle East prolif

Miklos 3/3 (Timothy, 2nd year M.A. student at the Elliott School of International Affairs in Security Policy Studies with a focus on nuclear weapons. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Michigan. Prior to his undergraduate studies he served honorably in the United States Marine Corps for 8 years. He is fluent in Russian. “Iran Proliferation Triggering a Nuclear Domino Effect in the Middle East: An Unrealistic Scenario.” International Affairs Review. <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/468>)

President Obama has stated that Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon will spark an arms race in the Middle East. This view is a status quo dogma among policymakers of both the Republican and Democratic parties, and dissenting views are generally ignored. Ari Shavit of Haaretz identifies the most at-risk states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East in response to an Iranian weapon is highly unlikely. For those countries most likely to proliferate, the political and financial costs are too high. The nuclear domino scenario has been an accepted doctrine since 1962 when President Kennedy warned that by the 1970s there would be around 25 nuclear weapon states. Yet, today there are only nine. According to a recent Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report, “Cairo does not see Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat.” Egypt’s true enemy is Israel, which has defeated Egypt in four consecutive wars. If Egypt did not pursue a nuclear option to deter its nuclear-armed enemy Israel, then it will not do so against Iran. Egypt simply does not have the financial resources, nuclear infrastructure, or motive to build a successful clandestine nuclear program, as its facilities are under IAEA safeguards. As a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Egypt has remained committed to non-proliferation since the Treaty’s inception and would be unlikely to withdraw. Even if Egypt had the capability and intention to pursue nuclear weapons, its security would not be enhanced. An attempted breakout would likely be destroyed in a preemptive strike by Israel, which has proven the credibility of this threat twice by destroying the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 and the Al Kibar reactor in Syria in 2007. Unlike Iran, Egypt does not have long distances, deep reactors, and strong air defenses to protect itself from Israeli preemption. Iran poses the largest threat to Saudi Arabia and, as such, the Kingdom would have the strongest security motive to pursue a deterrent. Riyadh has called on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, yet has repeatedly warned that an Iranian nuclear weapon may compel it to follow suit. This is not credible and is likely an attempt to pressure the United States to take greater action against Tehran. According to Philipp Bleek of the Monterey Institute, “states whose rivals pursue or acquire nuclear weapons are much likely to themselves explore a nuclear weapons option…but are no more (or less) likely to pursue or acquire nuclear weapons” ("Why do states proliferate?," Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1 The Role of Theory). Nasser of Egypt made a similar threat in response to Israel’s nuclear program and explored Egypt’s nuclear possibilities, but in 1968 chose to sign the NPT instead. Saudi Arabia has virtually no domestic nuclear infrastructure, resources, or knowledge base to conduct a “crash” program. It is also an NPT state and has many U.S. military and foreign investors on its territory, making it difficult to support such a program. Its only option would be to purchase a nuclear weapon from Pakistan. However, Islamabad is unlikely to spare any weapons, as they are needed to deter India. Additionally, selling a nuclear weapon would bring world condemnation on Pakistan and leave it a pariah state surrounded by nuclear enemies. Riyadh would risk losing the support of the United States if it were to attempt to pursue a deterrent, leaving it open to an Israeli strike. Instead, Saudi Arabia will likely rely on its preferred weapons of “cash and diplomacy,” finding the U.S. nuclear umbrella a “more attractive offer.” Turkey is a NATO member with around 70 tactical nuclear weapons on its soil and is protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. An indigenous nuclear program would forfeit this position. Etel Solingen (“Domestic Models of Political Survival," Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1 The Role of Theory) asserts that states with integrated economies face greater costs to proliferating and are therefore less likely to do so. There is too much at stake for these nations to develop nuclear weapons, as they each stand to suffer great financial and political losses and will ultimately be less secure because of it. The United States has far greater influence over these nations than it does over Iran. Washington should keep the pressure on Tehran to adhere to IAEA safeguards. However, alarmist rhetoric of a Middle East arms race is unjustified and not conducive to reaching an agreeable diplomatic settlement with Iran.

#### Iran is restrained by new leaders- costly signals prove

Walt 9-20-13 [Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006, previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as master of the social science collegiate division and deputy dean of social sciences, has been a resident associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and he has also been a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, “Is the Iranian President Sincere in Wanting a Nuclear Deal?” http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/20/is\_rouhani\_sincere\_iran\_nuclear\_deal]

By all indications, Iran's new president wants a deal with the United States on its nuclear program and has the authority to negotiate one. As predictably as the sunrise, hard-liners in the United States and Israel are dismissing the possibility on various grounds. Indeed, about 10 minutes after President Hasan Rouhani was elected, they began describing him as a "wolf in sheep's clothing" and suggesting that nothing had changed. Then, after Rouhani unleashed a wave of conciliatory actions, skeptics like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded by proposing a new set of deal-breaking conditions, and other Israeli officials suggested that time had already run out and that further diplomacy was a waste of time.¶ Given that these are the same people and organizations that have been pushing for military action against Iran for some time, it is hardly surprising that they pooh-pooh the prospect of diplomacy now. But notice that their core position is fundamentally contradictory: They have been saying for years that only sustained outside pressure will get Iran to "say uncle." So the United States and the European Union have ramped up sanctions and made repeated threats to use force. Surprise, surprise: Iran's new leaders are now saying they want a deal, precisely the response that this pressure was supposed to produce. If the hawks were consistent, they would at a minimum recommend that we explore the possibility carefully. Instead, they are trying to make sure that the United States continues to demand complete Iranian capitulation (or maybe even regime change). This tells you all you need to know about their sincerity and why Barack Obama shouldn't pay them the slightest attention.¶ In fact, the United States and Iran are facing a classic problem in international relations (and other forms of bargaining): Given that an adversary could be bluffing or dissembling, how do you know when a seemingly friendly gesture is sincere? Political scientist Robert Jervis explored this issue in depth in The Logic of Images in International Relations (1970) and drew a nice distinction between "signals" (i.e., actions that contain no inherent credibility) and "indices," which he defined as "statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct."¶ More recently, this basic idea was resurrected in economics (and borrowed by IR scholars) in the notion of a "costly signal." Unlike "cheap talk," a costly signal is an action that involves some cost or risk for the sender and therefore is one that the sender would be unlikely to make if they didn't really mean it. A classic example was Anwar Sadat's 1977 offer to fly to Jerusalem and speak directly to the Israeli Knesset in search of a peace deal. Because this move was obviously a risky step for Sadat (who was condemned throughout the Arab world), his Israeli counterparts had good reason to believe that his desire for peace was genuine.¶ So should we take Rouhani's overtures seriously? I think we should. As noted above, the possibility that Iran is genuinely interested in a deal is inherently credible, because we have in fact been squeezing the Iranians quite hard. To repeat: Isn't what they are now doing exactly what we've been trying to achieve? Equally important is that Iran has taken a wide range of actions that were not cost-free. First, Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif have been granted enhanced authority to negotiate a deal, and Rouhani has appointed officials who favor negotiations and are familiar to their American interlocutors. Any time you pick one set of officials over another, there are political costs involved. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has publicly stated that Iran should show "heroic flexibility," thereby lending his own authority to this effort. And this has all been done in public view, making it harder for Iran's leaders to reverse course on a whim.¶ Equally important is that the supreme leader has also endorsed Rouhani's position that the hard-line Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stay out of political matters such as this one. This step reminds us that Rouhani (and possibly Khameini himself) faces some internal opposition to a more conciliatory stance. Paradoxically, the fact that they have to override hard-liners at home is evidence of their sincerity: Pushing the IRGC to the sidelines is a "costly signal" that they are serious.¶ Iran has also taken some physical actions that indicate openness toward a deal. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran has slowed its accumulation of 20 percent enriched uranium, in effect remaining shy of the threshold needed to produce a bomb, and that Iran is still not operating all of its installed centrifuges. And Rouhani has publicly reiterated Iran's long-standing position that it is not going to acquire nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the diplomatic price it would pay if those words proved hollow.¶ Last but not least, Iran has also taken some more symbolic gestures, such as the release of human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh, Rouhani's public greeting to world Jewry on Rosh Hashanah, the implicit repudiation of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's questioning of the Holocaust, and the condemnation of chemical weapons use in Syria. Here it is also noteworthy that former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a longtime ally and associate of Rouhani, publicly blamed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for the attacks and even compared him to Saddam Hussein. Skeptics might deride all these developments as "cheap talk," but in the context of Iranian domestic politics, they are not without consequences. Among other things, these various gestures have made Rouhani & Co. more vulnerable to a hard-line backlash in the event that their more conciliatory approach leads nowhere.

#### Long timeframe and no iran prolif – no hard evidence of prolif, no capability, IAEA detection

Colin H. Kahl 12, security studies prof at Georgetown, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, “Not Time to Attack Iran”, January 17, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran?page=show>

Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented Iranian efforts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them. In arguing for a six-month horizon, Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons-grade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear device and considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weapons-grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The IAEA would thus detect such activity with sufficient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years off.

### Proxy

#### No proxy wars - leaders weak

Cook ‘7 (Steven, CFR senior fellow for Mid East Studies. BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, Ray Takeyh, CFR fellow, and Suzanne Maloney, Brookings fellow, Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast, <http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6383265>, June 28, 2007)

Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

# 2NC

The status quo disproves the effectiveness of procedural solutions focus – securitization results in a faith in experts centralizes political decision-making while excluding the public

Rana, ’11 [Aziz Rana received his A.B. summa cum laude from Harvard College and his J.D. from Yale Law School. He also earned a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard, where his dissertation was awarded the university's Charles Sumner Prize. He was an Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law at Yale; “Who Decides on Security?”; 8/11/11; Cornell Law Library; <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/87/>]

Today politicians and legal scholars routinely invoke fears that the balance between liberty and security has swung drastically in the direction of government’s coercive powers. In the post-September 11 era, such worries are so commonplace that in the words of one commentator, “it has become part of the drinking water of this country that there has been a trade-off of liberty for security.” According to civil libertarians, centralizing executive power and removing the legal constraints that inhibit state violence (all in the name of heightened security) mean the steady erosion of both popular deliberation and the rule of law. For Jeremy Waldron, current practices, from coercive interrogation to terrorism surveillance and diminished detainee rights, provide government the ability not only to intimidate external enemies but also internal dissidents and legitimate political opponents. As he writes, “We have to worry that the very means given to the government to combat our enemies will be used by the government against its enemies.” Especially disconcerting for many commentators, executive judgments – due to fears of infiltration and security leaks – are often cloaked in secrecy. This lack of transparency undermines a core value of democratic decisionmaking: popular scrutiny of government action. As U.S. Circuit Judge Damon Keith famously declared in a case involving secret deportations by the executive branch, “Democracies die behind closed doors. . . . When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation.” In the view of no less an establishment figure than Neal Katyal, now the Principal Deputy Solicitor General, such security measures transform the current presidency into “the most dangerous branch,” one that “subsumes much of the tripartite structure of government.” ¶ Widespread concerns with the government’s security infrastructure are by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, such voices are part of a sixty-year history of reform aimed at limiting state (particularly presidential) discretion and preventing likely abuses. What is remarkable about these reform efforts is that, every generation, critics articulate the same basic anxieties and present virtually identical procedural solutions. These procedural solutions focus on enhancing the institutional strength of both Congress and the courts to rein in the unitary executive. They either promote new statutory schemes that codify legislative responsibilities or call for greater court activism. As early as the 1940s, Clinton Rossiter argued that only a clearly established legal framework in which Congress enjoyed the power to declare and terminate states of emergency would prevent executive tyranny and rights violations in times of crisis. After the Iran-Contra scandal, Harold Koh, now State Department Legal Adviser, once more raised this approach, calling for passage of a National Security Charter that explicitly enumerated the powers of both the executive and the legislature, promoting greater balance between the branches and explicit constraints on government action. More recently, Bruce Ackerman has defended the need for an “emergency constitution” premised on congressional oversight and procedurally specified practices. As for increased judicial vigilance, Arthur Schlesinger argued nearly forty years ago, in his seminal book The Imperial Presidency (1973), that the courts “had to reclaim their own dignity and meet their own responsibilities” by abandoning deference and by offering a meaningful check to the political branches. Today, Lawrence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge once more imagine that, by providing a powerful voice of dissent, the courts can play a critical role in balancing the branches. They write that adjudication can “generate[]—even if largely (or, at times, only) in eloquent and cogently reasoned dissent—an apt language for potent criticism.” ¶ The hope – returned to by constitutional scholars for decades – has been that by creating clear legal guidelines for security matters and by increasing the role of the legislative and judicial branches, government abuse can be stemmed. Yet despite this reformist belief, presidential and military prerogatives continue to expand even when the courts or Congress intervene. Indeed, the ultimate result has primarily been to entrench further the system of discretion and centralization. In the case of congressional legislation (from the 200 standby statutes on the books to the post September 11 and Iraq War Authorizations for the Use of Military Force to the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Acts), this has often entailed Congress self-consciously playing the role of junior partner – buttressing executive practices by providing its own constitutional imprimatur to them. Thus, rather than rolling back security practices, greater congressional involvement has tended to further strengthen and internalize emergency norms within the ordinary operation of politics. As just one example, the USA PATRIOT Act, while no doubt controversial, has been renewed by Congress a remarkable ten consecutive times without any meaningful curtailments. Such realities underscore the dominant drift of security arrangements, a drift unhindered by scholarly suggestions and reform initiatives. Indeed, if anything, today’s scholarship finds itself mired in an argumentative loop, re-presenting inadequate remedies and seemingly incapable of recognizing past failures. ¶ What explains both the persistent expansion of the federal government’s security framework as well as the inability of civil libertarian solutions to curb this expansion? In this article I argue that the current reform debate ignores the broader ideological context that shapes how the balance between liberty and security is struck. In particular, the very meaning of security has not remained static but rather has changed dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. This shift has principally concerned the basic question of who decides on issues of war and emergency. And as the following pages explore, at the center of this shift has been a transformation in legal and political judgments about the capacity of citizens to make informed and knowledgeable decisions in security domains. Yet, while underlying assumptions about popular knowledge – its strengths and limitations – have played a key role in shaping security practices in each era of American constitutional history, this role has not been explored in any sustained way in the scholarly literature. ¶ As an initial effort to delineate the relationship between knowledge and security, I will argue that throughout most of the American experience, the dominant ideological perspective saw security as grounded in protecting citizens from threats to their property and physical well-being (especially those threats posed by external warfare and domestic insurrection). Drawing from a philosophical tradition extending back to John Locke, politicians and thinkers – ranging from Alexander Hamilton and James Madison at the founding to Abraham Lincoln and Roger Taney – maintained that most citizens understood the forms of danger that imperiled their physical safety. The average individual knew that securing collective life was in his or her own interest, and also knew the institutional arrangements and practices that would fulfill this paramount interest. A widespread knowledge of security needs was presumed to be embedded in social experience, indicating that citizens had the skill to take part in democratic discussion regarding how best to protect property or to respond to forms of external violence. Thus the question of who decides was answered decisively in favor of the general public and those institutions – especially majoritarian legislatures and juries – most closely bound to the public’s wishes. ¶ What marks the present moment as distinct is an increasing repudiation of these assumptions about shared and general social knowledge. Today the dominant approach to security presumes that conditions of modern complexity (marked by heightened bureaucracy, institutional specialization, global interdependence, and technological development) mean that while protection from external danger remains a paramount interest of ordinary citizens, these citizens rarely possess the capacity to pursue such objectives adequately. Rather than viewing security as a matter open to popular understanding and collective assessment, in ways both small and large the prevailing concept sees threat as sociologically complex and as requiring elite modes of expertise. Insulated decision-makers in the executive branch, armed with the specialized skills of the professional military, are assumed to be best equipped to make sense of complicated and often conflicting information about safety and self-defense. The result is that the other branches – let alone the public writ large – face a profound legitimacy deficit whenever they call for transparency or seek to challenge presidential discretion. Not surprisingly, the tendency of procedural reform efforts has been to place greater decision-making power in the other branches and then to watch those branches delegate such power back to the very same executive bodies.

### Impact Calc/AT: Extinction Outweighs

#### That genocidal violence creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

---Confronting the threat of iran strikes implicitly maintains sovereign violence. The plan displays American benevolence while reifying the state of exception that makes the extermination of populations possible.

Dabashi 2007

Hamid, Thinking beyond the US invasion of Iran, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/831/focus.htm

More than being at war, what works best for the US/Israeli warlords is being in "a state of war" -- for the fear of war is the best condition in which they want to keep the world. Come March, April, May or whenever, US/Israel may or may not, invade Iran. If the war indeed happens, no one will count the Iranian dead, for counting them will amount to no moral outrage loud enough to match what is happening to the world. CNN will count the US soldiers' casualties, but even this, too, will dissipate into a vacuous pomposity that could not care less about the poor and disenfranchised Americans who are grabbed by the throat of their poverty, and catapulted half way around the globe to maim, murder, torture, and rape their own brothers and sisters. For every one US casualty (which is one too many) there will be anywhere between one to two hundred Iranian casualties, if we were to take the Iraqi case as our measure. No one will hold anyone responsible. The Iranian neo-con contingency will have made their career and lucrative contracts, and still appear on television. Just like Fouad Ajami, they will tell Americans that these Iranians, just like Iraqis, did not deserve the gift of freedom and democracy that the Americans were offering them (as he proposes in his new book The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq ). The rest of the world will have gotten even more used to the state of war that US/Israel is imposing on the globe. The invasion of Iran will add yet another front to the US/ Israeli global flexing of its military prowess. And if they -- the US government and Jewish state (the two most violent states on planet Earth) -- don't invade Iran, it still makes no difference. All it takes is a comment here by President Bush, or a suggestion there by Vice President Cheney, or yet another confession that Israel makes that it indeed has massive nuclear capacities -- or else planting of a news story that Israel may attack Iran. The actual context of these news, that the US/Israel may or may not attack Iran, is entirely irrelevant to the reality of positing these threats. It is this that keeps the world on the edge of its seat, making fear and warmongering the paramount condition of our lives. In his groundbreaking work on the "state of exception", the distinguished Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has begun the uncanny task of theorising what has hitherto been delegated to the realm of necessities legem non habet ("necessity has no law"). Defying this dictum, Agamben has taken Karl Schmitt's famous pronouncement in his Political Theology (that the sovereign is "he who decides on the state of exception") quite seriously and sought to theorise that state of exception. In Agamben's own project, what he calls the "no- man's land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and life" remains paramount. But adjacent to that effectively juridical project, there remains a widespread culture of catastrophe that must systematically generate and sustain that state of exception, which here and now in the United States, and the world it ruthlessly rules, amounts to a perpetual state of war. It is to that state, and not merely its potential and actual evidence, that we must learn how to respond.

### Cooption DA

Combinations of the alternative and the state result in the cooption of intellectuals into a political, interventionist sphere

BISWAS 07 (Shampa, Prof – Politics, Whitman, 2007 "Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist" Millennium 36 (1)

While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Nuclear fear is mobilized to preemptively intervene in countries – causes 1NC impacts and turns the case

Masco, ‘8 (Joseph, ““Survival Is Your Business”: Engineering Ruins and Affect in Nuclear America” Cultural Anthropology, May 2008. Vol. 23, Issue 2)

Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.¶ President George W. Bush, address to the nation on Iraq on October 7, 2002 ¶ Be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age.¶ President Musharraf of Pakistan, reporting on a message delivered to him from the U.S. State Department immediately after 9/11¶ Reclaiming the emotional history of the atomic bomb is crucial today, as nuclear fear has been amplified to enable a variety of political projects at precisely the moment American memory of the bomb has become impossibly blurred. In the United States, nuclear fear has recently been used to justify preemptive war and unlimited domestic surveillance, a worldwide system of secret prisons, and the practices of rendition, torture, and assassination. But what today do Americans actually know or remember about the bomb? We live not in the ruins produced by Soviet ICBMs but, rather, in the emotional ruins of the Cold War as an intellectual and social project. The half-century-long project to install and articulate the nation through contemplating its violent end has colonized the present. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D. C, in 2001 may have produced a political consensus that "the Cold War is over" and a formal declaration of a counterterrorism project.23 But American reactions to those attacks were structured by a multigenerational state project to harness the fear of mass death to divergent political and military industrial agendas.¶ By evoking the image of the mushroom cloud to enable the invasion of Iraq, Bush appealed directly to citizens' nuclear fear, a cultural product of the very Cold War nuclear standoff he formally disavowed in inaugurating the new counterterrorist state. The mushroom-cloud imagery, as well as the totalizing immediacy of the threat in his presentation, worked to redeploy a cultural memory of apocalyptic nuclear threat (established during the four decades of the Soviet- American nuclear arms race) as part of the new "war on terror." The new color-coded terrorist warning system (first proposed by Project East River in 1952 to deal with Soviet bombers), as well as the more recent transformation of shampoo bottles on planes into a totalizing threat by the Homeland Security Administration, are official efforts to install and regulate fear in everyday life.24 In this regard, the "war on terror" has been conducted largely as an emotional management campaign in the United States, using the tropes and logics developed during the early Cold War to enable a new kind of U.S. geopolitical project. The "war on terror" redirects but also reiterates the American assumptions about mass violence and democracy I have explored in this essay.¶ If the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, D. C, felt strangely familiar to many U.S. citizens, it was because American society has been imaginatively rehearsing the destruction of these cities for over three generations: in the civil defense campaigns of the early and late Cold War, as well as the Hollywood blockbusters of the 1990s, which destroyed these cities each summer with increasing nuance and detail. The genealogy of this form of entertainment is traumatic, it goes back to the specific way in which the United States entered the nuclear age with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the specific propaganda campaigns informing nuclear threat throughout the Cold War. Indeed, the ease with which the September 11, 2001, attacks were nationalized as part of a nuclear discourse by the Bush administration has much to do with this legacy (see Kaplan 2003). Not coincidentally, the two graphic measures of nuclear blast damage most frequently used during the Cold War were the Pentagon and the New York City skyline (cf. Eden 2004). Figures 8 and 9, for example, are taken from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission campaign to document the size of the first U.S. hydrogen bomb test from 1952. Fourteen true-to-scale versions of the Pentagon (identified by the AEC as the largest building in the world) are placed inside the blast crater (the former Elugelab Island) to document its size, while the New York skyline is used to demonstrate the vast horizontal and vertical scope of the detonation. The events of 9/11 were easily nationalized and transformed into a nuclear discourse precisely because our security culture has imagined and rehearsed attacks on Washington and New York for generations, and because the specific symbols in the attacks (the Pentagon and the tallest building in the New York sky line) were also used by the nuclear state for three generations as part of its emotional management strategy. The Bush administration, in other words, mobilized a well-established logic of nuclear attack to pursue its policy objectives, translating discrete, nonnuclear threats into the emotional equivalent of the Cold War nuclear crisis.¶ For a nation that constructs itself via discourses of ruination, it should not be a surprise to see the exportation of ruins on a global scale. As President Musharraf clearly understood, the "with us or against us" logic of the Bush administration in 2001 left no ambiguity about the costs of Pakistan not aligning with the sole global superpower. The threat to reduce Pakistan to the "Stone Age" is the alternative, international deployment of nuclear fear, constituting a U.S. promise to reduce his country to a prenational, pretechnological state. Thus, the United States enters the 21st century as a nation both fascinated and traumatized by nuclear ruins. It transforms real and imagined mass death into a nationalized space, and supports a political culture that believes bombing campaigns can produce democracy abroad. It is simultaneously terrorized by nuclear weapons and threatens to use them. The U.S. military both wages preemptive war over nascent "WMD" programs and is preparing to build a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons.25 American society is today neither "atomic bomb proof nor capable of engaging nuclear technologies as a global problem of governance. Instead, U.S. citizens live today in the emotional residues of the Cold War nuclear arms race, which can only address them as fearful docile bodies. Thus, even in the 21st century, Americans remain caught between terror and fear, trapped in the psychosocial space defined by the once and future promise of nuclear ruins.¶

### Risk Calc Bad

#### Risk calculus causes endless threats

Bachrach 13 (Theodore Bachrach works for a non profit organization and has worked in the UK Parliament, International Security Observer, "The Rise of Risk in International Security Policy", http://securityobserver.org/the-rise-of-risk-in-international-security-policy/, April 24, 2013)

Risk is the defining feature of modern society. Citizens today are risk averse and the desire to ‘manage’ risk has become the lingua franca of business, politics, economics and public policy. It has also become the language of security strategy and war. Put succinctly ‘Risk and uncertainty are the hallmark of world politics at the dawn of the twenty-first century’[i]. But why is this? And what does it mean for international security?¶ At the end of the Cold War there was a transition in security strategy from the monolithic, state-centric viewpoint of a world conveniently split between two (Cold) warring ideological viewpoints to a world of unbounded known and unknown risks, able to spread easily from one part of the world to another, irrespective of state boundaries. From a western security standpoint the end of the Cold War, instead of making states feel more secure, had the paradoxical effect of making states feel more uncertain and at risk than before. The beast had been slain but now the security landscape resembled a jungle full of snakes.¶ ¶ Recognising this, NATO in the nineties changed its modus operandi to one of managing security risks openly acknowledging that the threats its members were up against were not static nation states but elusive and flexible non-state actors able to capitalise on the revolution in information technology and the shrinking of time and space brought about by globalisation. Its 1991 New Strategic Concept acknowledged that ‘In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved’[ii]. Likewise the UK 1998 Strategic Review acknowledged that ‘stability based on the active management of risks’ was the challenge at hand[iii].¶ ¶ This shift stems from a wider sociological change to a risk society in which the ideas of controllability, certainty and security have collapsed[iv]. The result is state’s scrambling to re-take control of the uncertain future; to manage the risks. Whilst the future cannot totally be colonized, a policy of security risk management, allows states to ‘minimize or reduce factors which lead to risk occurring’[v]. French philosopher Michael Foucault referring to risk once stated the suitable metaphor for government was a ship: in our risk adverse society government attempts to manage risk can be seen as an attempt to steer society toward the safe harbour avoiding risks along the way. If a few targeted killings and pre-emptive strikes mean safe passage, so be it.¶ Risk in security policy is proving itself to be primarily an energizing principle. Politicians and security decision makers become increasingly reflexive as they endeavour to avert future risks through anticipatory measures. A critical feature of this security “Zeitgeist” is that knowledge and lack of knowledge become equally constitutive[vi] resulting in policy responses that treat them both on the same risk level. Whilst we know what some of the risks are, we also know that there are risks we don’t yet know about which need to be protected against as well. In trying to imagine what these risks are strategists undertake a process of premeditation; imagine the worst futures and then attempt to harness and “commodify” the risks and uncertainty through pre-emptive risk management policies. [vii] ¶ When 9/11 demonstrated the notion of geographical space as a protective barrier was tragically false security, US security planners in response proposed ‘routinizing the exercise of imagination, thus turning a scenario into constructive action’[viii]. Take the publicly presented speculative justification for war in Iraq and Afghanistan where nightmare scenarios of despot leaders colluding with terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda were “sold” as facts. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, referring to Afghanistan, stated that ‘whilst there are risks of action, we know the risks of inaction are much greater’ a rationale mirrored by former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney regarding Iraq: ‘the risks of inaction are far greater than those of action’[ix]. Similarly the policy of drone strikes and targeted killings are a reflection of a security policy of pre-emption rather than reaction. Targeted killings are a form of ‘uncertainty absorption’ literally aimed at the elimination of threats before they can demonstrate their full potential. Individuals who may not have been responsible for a criminal act on foreign soil and might not even present an imminent threat are targeted owing to their status as a potential risk. A report by the Council of Foreign Relations on drones states that ‘the vast majority of those targeted via drones were neither al-Qaeda nor Taliban leaders rather most were low-level, anonymous suspected militants who were predominately engaged in insurgent or terrorists operations against their governments, rather than in active international terrorist plots’[x][xi]. The logic of objectification and imagining futures inherent in security risk management magnifies the non-innocence of low level insurgents to those of top leaders. As former President George W. Bush once said ‘If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we have waited too long’[xii].¶ ¶ The largest problem with making risk the heuristic device through which security policy is determined is that unlike risk management in business and economics, security risk is not objective and quantitatively rational. Risks are socially constructed phenomena meaning they can be whatever the decision makers of the day want them to be. This has real life and death consequences for when one selects a strategy of making presumed (lack of) knowledge the foundation of actions against risks the flood-gates of fear are opened and everything becomes threatening and everyone a potential risk[xiii]. The effect of this modus operandi within international security is that whilst simultaneously making citizens more secure by eliminating risks before they become active threats capable of destruction, the culture of risk-management perpetuates itself as, without a concrete enemy, new risks always have to be established and managed in order for societies to convince themselves they are secure.

#### Threats are inflated and violence by the US is downplayed – history flows neg

Herman 03 ( Edward S. Herman is an economist, author, media analyst, and a regular contributor to Z since 1988. Z Magazine, "Threat Inflation Going after hapless countries", http://www.zcommunications.org/threat-inflation-going-after-hapless-countries-by-edward-herman.html, March 2003)

One of the most striking features of the working of the U.S. imperial system and media is the regular inflation of the threat posed by imperial targets—an inflation process that very often attains the ludicrous and incredible. When the imperial managers want to go after some hapless small country—Guatemala, Nicaragua, Yugoslavia, Iraq—that for one reason or another has been put on the U.S. hit list, the managers issue fearsome warnings of the dire threat posed by the prospective victim. The media quickly get on this bandwagon and suddenly give enormous attention to a country previously completely ignored. Critical analyses of the reality of the “threat” are minimal, and the gullibility quotient of the media escalates in view of the alleged seriousness of the threat and need for everybody to be “on the team.” As soon as the small target is smashed—with great ease, despite the prior claims of its capability—and as official attention moves elsewhere, the media drop the subject and allow the target to return to black hole attention.¶ ¶ A closely related feature of the threat inflation process has been the unwillingness of the media to allow that the United States poses any threat to the imminent victim. U.S. officials may even have announced an intention to displace a government, they may have organized a proxy army to invade, and positioned their own forces in the vicinity, but any actions of the target to prepare to defend itself are considered sinister and further proof of their menacing character. In the Cold War era, when targets reached out to the Soviet bloc to get arms, this added to the proof of a threat, demonstrating that they were part of the larger Soviet threat. That they sought weapons from the Soviet bloc because they were prevented from buying them from the United States and its allies, and that forcing them to do this was part of a strategy making their threat more credible, was outside the orbit of media thought.¶ ¶ Thus, in the official and therefore media view, threats were and remain unidirectional—democratic Guatemala (1945-54), Sandinista Nicaragua (1980-90), Iraq today have allegedly posed threats to the United States, but they themselves are not threatened by it. This results in part from the media’s ideological and patriotic subservience. Just as in a totalitarian society, the media here take it as a premise that their leaders are good and pursue decent ends, so that invidious words like “threat” or “aggression” cannot be applied to their language and behavior. This is helped along by the fact that the targeted leaders are quickly demonized, so that any apparent threats from our end are a response to evil and quest for justice (as well as countering a real threat). This exquisitely and comically biased perspective has helped make it possible to find that no actions by the targets constitute “self defense,” and in effect they do not have any right of self-defense.¶ Guatemala¶ G uatemala in the late 1940s and early 1950s offers a model case. Guatemala’s democratic leaders had aroused suspicion by granting labor the right to form unions back in 1947, and when in 1952 president Jacopo Arbenz proposed taking over idle United Fruit land (with compensation) in the interest of landless peasants, United Fruit Company and U.S. government officials escalated the charges of a dire Communist threat. The media, which had previously rarely mentioned Guatemala, increasingly focused on the official target. The Communists never “took over” Guatemala (see Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fr uit ), but United Fruit, the U.S. government, and the media claimed that they had, and the media became frenetic and hysterical on the subject. This was a completely fraudulent threat to U.S. national security. On the other hand, the United States posed a genuine security threat to Guatemala, openly menacing it with hostile words and organizing a “contra” army in Nicaragua to invade Guatemala. The United States also refused to sell arms to Guatemala and got its allies to do the same. When Guatemala imported a small quantity of arms from Czechoslovakia in 1953 this caused a media frenzy, and demonstrated for the media the aggressive intent of the U.S. target. In the U.S. media the notion that Guatemala was threatened and might be acting in self defense in acquiring arms was outside the realm of permissible thought. After all, could the United States be planning a proxy aggression against Guatemala? Not for the amazing U.S. media—the tiny target threatened us.¶ None of the non-dictatorships in Latin America considered Guatemala a threat, although they were closer to the U.S. target and less capable of defending themselves from it if the threat were valid. But they were bribed and bullied by John Foster Dulles into condemning “international communism” in the hemisphere and the need to confront it. Did the U.S. officials believe the malarkey about a threat? The NSC Policy Statement on “United States Policy in the Event of Guatemalan Aggression in Latin America” (May 28, 1954) conveys the impression of official panic over the Guatemala menace, declaring Guatemala to be “increasingly [an] instrument of Soviet aggression in this hemisphere.” This was about a virtually disarmed tiny country that had not moved one inch outside its borders, in which the Soviet Union had invested nothing and with which Guatemala didn’t even maintain diplomatic relations (out of fear of U.S. reaction), whose democratic government was shortly to be overthrown by a rag-tag proxy army, with much U.S. assistance.¶ After the overthrow of the Guatemalan democracy in 1954 the media once again allowed Guatemala to disappear from their sights. A very similar process took place following the victory of the Sandinistas over the authoritarian Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1980. Here again it was the democratic government that quickly became a “threat” to the United States, after the United States had supported dictatorship for 45 years. Here again it organized a contra army to harass and invade the democracy. Once again it imposed an economic and arms embargo on the target, forcing it to acquire arms from the Soviet bloc, and then using this to demonstrate that it was an instrument of that bloc. Once again the nearby small countries were not frightened by the new menace, and much of their effort was spent trying to settle the conflict—in opposition to the Reagan administration’s preference for the use of force.¶ Nicaragua, Soviet Threat, etc., etc.¶ H ere again, also, after the Sandinista government was ousted, following a decade of boycott and U.S.-sponsored international terrorism, the media were enthused over this triumph of democracy and U.S. “patience” in using means other than a direct invasion to end social democracy in Nicaragua. Once this “threat” was terminated, the media once again moved away from Nicaragua to focus on other good deeds by their leaders coping with other threats. As with Guatemala, and later in the case of NATO-occupied Kosovo, the media carefully averted their eyes from the results, which were not in keeping with the alleged war aims and claims that beneficial effects would follow the removal of the threat.¶ The big threat featured in the Cold War years was that posed by the Soviet Union, which at least referred to the challenge of a serious rival on the global scene. But even here, the threat was misread and hugely inflated. The Soviet Union was always a conservative and defensive-minded regional power, its reach beyond its near neighbors tentative, reactive, and weak. It never posed a threat to the United States and constantly sought accommodation with the real (U.S.) superpower—its real threat was that it offered an alternative development model and supported resistance to the global thrust of U.S. imperialism.¶ On the other hand, World War II was hardly over when the United States was funding groups trying to destabilize the Soviet Union and in NSC 68 (1950) U.S. officials laid out an agenda for destabilization and “regime change” in the Soviet Union as basic U.S. policy. The United States never accepted the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and from the invasions in 1917 to the final important assist given Yeltsin and his apparatchiks, its aim has been regime change.¶ But in the U.S. propaganda system it was an ideological premise that the Soviet Union was trying to conquer the world and we were on the defensive, “containing” it. This was confirmed when Khrushchev said, “We are going to bury you,” a blustering statement that was hardly on a par with the neglected NSC 68 policy pronouncement of an intent to bury the Soviet Union. A prime fact of Cold War history was that the Soviet Union provided a limit to U.S. expansionism—and it was the end of that real containment that has allowed the United States to go on its current rampage.¶ It should be noted that throughout the Cold War U.S. officials proclaimed Soviet advances and “gaps” that invariably proved to be disinformation, but which the New York Times and its colleagues invariably passed along as truth. Equally important, when it turned out that the “missile gap,” “warhead gap,” or “window of vulnerability” was a lie, the media kept this under the rug, along with the fact that they had been propaganda and disinformation agents. In his classic, The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy (Harper & Row, 1986), Tom Gervasi showed how the media passed along Reagan administration claims of Soviet superiority in weapons systems that were refutable from the Pentagon’s own information releases, but which the New York Times and company were too lazy or too complicit with their leaders to examine and challenge, saying merely that figures “were difficult to pin down” ( NYT ), which was false. As Gervasi said, “The frequent assertions of editors...that they must strive for ‘balance’ and ‘objectivity,’ were simply an effort to hide the lack of attempt at either, to justify wholly uncritical acceptance of official views, and to deny that a great deal of information was missing from public view.”¶ Iraq¶ I n the buildup to the first Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991, U.S. officials and the media conveyed the impression that Iraq was a mighty power and huge military challenge to the United States and its “allies,” when in fact Iraq was a Third World country exhausted by its brutal conflict with Iran and hardly able to put up token resistance to the “allied” assault. It was overwhelmed within a week and forced into de facto surrender. Ironically, Iraq didn’t dare to use any weapons of mass destruction it possessed, but the “allies” blew up a number of Iraq weapons caches, spewing forth chemicals on allied soldiers and Iraqi civilians. The United States also used depleted uranium “dirty” munitions, thus making the Persian Gulf war a low level nuclear war, as it was later to do in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Once again, following the war—or more properly, slaughter—the media failed to reflect on either the evidence that the threat had been inflated or the costs of the war in terms of “friendly fire”—or rather “friendly use of depleted uranium and release of enemy chemicals”—on both allied soldiers and Iraqi civilians.¶ In the buildup to the prospective 2003 attack on Iraq, once again there has been a multi-pronged threat inflation that the mainstream media pass along in their now standard propaganda agency role.¶ Most important, there is the pretense that if Iraq possessed WMD it would pose a serious threat of using them offensively and against the United States in particular. To make this plausible the officials-media phalanx stress what a bad person Saddam is and the fact that he used WMD in the 1980s. What the phalanx avoids discussing are: (1) that Saddam only used those weapons when supplied and supported by the United States and Britain—he did not use them in the Persian Gulf War; (2) that the sanctions and inspections regime has made him far weaker now than in 1991 when he failed to use such weapons; (3) that his use of them offensively against either the United States or any U.S. client state would be suicidal; and (4) that it follows that if he possessed them they would only be serviceable for defensive purposes. The idea that he poses a serious threat to the United States, claimed by President George Bush and his associates, is therefore absurd. But it is reported in the media as real and is essentially unchallenged. It is certainly never called absurd, as it is. Saddam does pose a possible threat to U.S. forces if attacked, but only then. We get back to the fact, however, that a target of U.S. enmity, from Vietnam to the Sandinista government of Nicaragua to Iraq has no right of self-defense in the media propaganda system.¶ Further arrows in the war-makers quiver are the facts that Saddam is a cruel dictator and that he has been less than completely cooperative with the inspections process designed to assure the elimination of his WMD. The former is true but irrelevant and its use is hypocritical. The United States and Britain supported this dictator when he served their interests and it continues to support others who are amenable, as Saddam appeared to be in the 1980s. International law and the UN Charter do not allow “regime change” of dictatorships by military intervention and actions with such design constitute straightforward aggression. “Helping” people by warring on them is also profoundly hypocritical and there is every reason to doubt any humanitarian end in Bush administration war planning.¶ It is also true that Saddam has not been fully cooperative with the inspections system, but why should he be when the United States has repeatedly admitted that inspections are a cover for an intent to dislodge him from power and have been used in the past to locate war targets? (The same motive of regime change underlies the genocidal sanctions regime that has killed over a million Iraqi civilians.) Furthermore, the inspections regime is a U.S.-British imposition that reflects their domination of the Security Council and their political agenda, it has nothing to do with justice. Israel is allowed to have WMD and ignore UN Security Council rulings because it is a Western ally and client, but Israel not only threatens its neighbors, it has repeatedly invaded Lebanon and is currently carrying out a ruthless program of repression and ethnic cleansing in occupied Palestine, in violation of UN rulings and the Fourth Geneva Convention. But the U.S. mainstream media ignore this, and have gotten on the bandwagon, proclaiming that Iraq’s lack of full cooperation with the inspections regime is intolerable.¶ A number of critical writers have stressed that while Iraq poses no threat to the United States, the attack on Iraq will create a threat in a feedback process. Thus Dan Ellsberg points out that: (1) “the number of recruits for suicide bombing against the U.S. and its allies...will increase a hundredfold;” (2) “regimes with sizeable Muslim populations (including Indonesia, the Philippines, France and Germany...) will find it politically almost impossible to be seen collaborating with the US on the anti-terrorism intelligence and police operations that are essential to lessening the terrorist threat...”; (3) Iraq under attack, and possibly even segments of the Pakistani army, may finally share WMD with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups (Dan Ellsberg on Iraq, Weblog Entry, Jan. 23, 2003, www.ellsberg.net/weblog/1\_23\_03.htm).¶ Once again the mainstream media have cooperated in a ludicrous threat inflation, which has prepared the ground for their country to wage a war of aggression. That war will not reduce a threat from Iraq, which was negligible, but it will produce serious threats as a consequence of the attack. However, this may well be what some of Bush’s advisers want, as it will justify further U.S. militarization and warfare, intensified repression at home, and provide a cover for further Bush service to his business constituency here and for Sharon’s accelerated ethnic cleansing and transfer in Palestine.

Studies prove that the more specific forecasts are the less probable they are – causes flawed threat evaluation that results in serial policy failure

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The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.)

Epistemology focus is good

1. All knowledge is socially conditioned

John Agnew, Professor of Geography at UCLA, 2007, International Political Sociology, (2007) 1, p. 143

Various ‘‘social studies’’ of science take these insights down to the level of the laboratory and the classroom. In the context of world politics, what they suggest is that all knowledge, including that claiming the mantle of science, is at least socially conditioned by the rituals, routines, and recruitment practices of powerful educational and research institutions. Thus, the assumption of ‘‘anarchy’’ beyond state borders is not an objective fact about the world but a claim socially constructed by theorists and actors operating in conditioning sites and venues (premier universities, think-thanks, government offices, etc.), which unthinkingly reproduce the assumption drawing on unimpeachable intellectual precursors (such as Machiavelli and Hobbes) irrespective of its empirical ‘‘truth’’ status (O´ Tuathail 1996). Other ideas such as those of ‘‘rational choice’’ and ‘‘hegemonic succession’’ can be thought of similarly as reflecting the social and political experiences of particular theorists in specific places as much as objective truth about the world per se (see, respectively, e.g., Grunberg 1990; Green and Shapiro 1996; Taylor 2006). If believed, of course, and if in the hands of those powerful enough, they can become guides to action that make their own reality.

### AT: No Root Cause

#### Not responsive – we’ve not saying that energy production is the root cause of all impacts – we’re saying their knowledge production is circular and insolates a privileged view of policy making – their discourse becomes hegemonic and crowds out alternative viewpoints

#### Hegemonic forms of knowledge is the biggest internal link to global violence

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.[86](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn86" \o ") Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'[87](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn87" \o ")  What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.  The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.  But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.[88](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn88" \o ")) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly[89](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn89" \o ") nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.  When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.[90](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn90" \o ")  This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?[91](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html" \l "_edn91" \o ") And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

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#### Discourse first – speech acts that legitimize security create the only scenario for extinction

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The Real Effects of Language

As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language.¶ Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

## Strikes

#### Discourse on Israeli strikes create a militarized atmosphere that prevent even the possibility of diplomacy

Parsi 9, Trita(Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies). “[Netanyahu and Threat of Bombing Iran -- The Bluff that Never Stops Giving?](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trita-parsi/netanyahu-and-threat-of-b_b_183822.html)” April 8 2009. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trita-parsi/netanyahu-and-threat-of-b\_b\_183822.html accessed August 24](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trita-parsi/netanyahu-and-threat-of-b_b_183822.html%20accessed%20August%2024), 2009.

Yet, the threat of military action, or rather the bluff, serves a purpose: Threats of military action militarizes the atmosphere. It creates an environment that renders diplomacy less likely to succeed -- it may even prevent diplomacy from being pursued in the first place. ¶ In the Iranian case, Netanyahu's tough talk undermines the Obama administration's prospects for diplomacy in the following ways. ¶ Getting to the negotiating table has proven an arduous task for the US and Iran. Both sides are currently testing each other's intentions, asking themselves if the other side is serious about diplomacy or if the perceived desire for talks is merely a tactical maneuver to either buy time or build greater international support for more confrontational policies down the road. From Tehran's perspective, uncertainty about Washington's intentions during the Bush administration was partly fueled by the insistence of the military option remaining on the table. Tehran seemed to fear entering negotiations that could have been designed to fail, since that could strengthen the case for military action against Iran.¶ Today, talk of Israeli strikes has similar effects. Tehran has repeatedly failed to appreciate the policy differences between Washington and Tel Aviv, oftentimes seeing them as either a perfectly coordinated team or as a single entity. Consequently, explicit or implicit threats of Israeli military action reduce Tehran's confidence in Washington's intentions.¶ Furthermore, Iran's sense of a threat from the US (and in extension Israel) is believed to be one of the driving forces of Iran's nuclear program. Whether Iran seeks a weapon or a civilian program that provides Iran with a weapons capability, the program's existence provides Tehran with a level of deterrence against the perceived US threat. The Obama administration's approach seems to have been to reduce Iran's sense of threat in order to kick-start negotiations. The threat of Israeli military action does the opposite -- it fuels Iranian insecurity and closes the window for diplomacy.

### Racism DA

#### Policy regarding Iran and the middle east as threats is warped by securitization- ensures violence and stereotype replication.

Izadi ‘7 (Foad Izadi & Hakimeh Saghaye-Biria, @ LSU Baton Rouge, ‘7 [Journal of Communication Inquiry 31.2, “A Discourse Analysis of Elite merican Newspaper Editorials,” p. sage]

U.S. policy makers and strategists have repeatedly stressed Iran’s important geopolitical and strategic position in the Middle East. In the words of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (2001), “There are few nations in the world with which the United States has less reason to quarrel or more compatible interests than Iran” (p. 197). Heiss (2000) highlights the role Orientalism played in U.S.-Iran relations during Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq’s era in the early 1950s. Between 1951 and 1953, Iran was the first country in the Middle East to struggle to gain control of its oil industry. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, renamed The British Petroleum Company in 1954, was Britain’s largest overseas investment (British Petroleum, n.d.). According to Heiss (2000), “The end result of the Orientalization of Mosaddeq was an increasingly rigid Anglo-American position on the oil crisis that eschewed compromise or concessions and ultimately saw removing him from office as the only acceptable course of action” (p. 184). Ultimately, the Anglo-American coup in Iran in 1953, which toppled Mosaddeq, brought back the Shah after he was deposed and enabled Western companies to regain control of Iranian oil (Gasiorowski & Byrne, 2004). In Covering Islam, Said (1981) identifies media coverage of postrevolutionary Iran a case in point concerning the prevalence of Orientalist depictions of Islam and Muslims. Likewise, McAlister (2001) contends that the threat of “Islam” and “terrorism” (p. 275) has supplied the cultural logic of U.S. foreign policy since the events of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Although Iran is not an Arab country, according to McAlister, “Anti-Iranian sentiment in the United States drew heavily on the stereotyped representations of the Arab Middle East that had become so prevalent in the 1970s, particularly the image of ‘Arab terrorism’” (p. 214).

Racism must be rejected in EVERY INSTANCE without surcease – prerequisite to morality.

Memmi ’00 [2000, Albert is a Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris, Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165]

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim(and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated**;** that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view**,** if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is “the truly capital sin////.**”**fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death**.** It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. Itis an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be . In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

## Prolif

#### Proliferation discourse relies on racist, ideological machinery that distorts effective nuclear policy and results in the purging of dangerous, otherness

Gutterson, 99 [Hugh - Anthopology prof at MIT, “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology, 14.1] p. 111-145

According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often re- veal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the ac- tual dangers that are feared (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970. The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five coun- tries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. Accord- ing to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 promised to assist other signa- tories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international in- spections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Al- though the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nu- clear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4-designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly le- gitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995). Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western dis- course on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the wordproliferation. This usage split off the "ver- tical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and im- proved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weap- ons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back ap- peals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basi- cally formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western co~ntries.~ This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably dif- ferent from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impul- sive and emotional; where "we" are modem and flexible, "they" are slaves to an- cient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contempo- rary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse

## Proxy

#### Their Orientalist security rhetoric constructs the Middle East according to US interests – causes conflict.

Bilgin, ‘4**—**assistant prof,IR, Bilkent U. PhD, IR, U Wales (Pinar, Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security, http://www.arts.yorku.ca/politics/ncanefe/docs/readings%20for%20the%20curious%20mind/Pinar%20Bilgin%20on%20Whose%20Middle%20East.pdf)

The significance of conceiving the relationship between regions and security as mutually constitutive becomes more explicit once one recognizes that the ‘Middle East’ has developed to its present condition partly due to the way it has been represented by the dominant security discourses. Throughout the 20th century representations of the ‘Middle East’ (in foreign policy- and opinion-makers’ discourses as well as in popular culture)15 have underwritten certain security practices that were deemed fit for the ‘character’ of the region. In other words, the current state of (in)security in the ‘Middle East’ has its roots in practices that have been informed by its representation. What shaped this particular dominant representation, in turn, was the conception of security in which it was rooted. It is in this sense that having a better grasp of what Simon Dalby calls the ‘politics of the geographical specification of politics’16 becomes crucial, for it enables one to begin thinking differently about the future of security in the ‘Middle East’ while remaining sensitive to security concerns and needs of myriad actors that propound contending perspectives. Having traced the development of the ‘Middle East’ (as a concept and as a region) back to security policies of late 19th-century Britain, the following sections will turn to four contending perspectives on regional security that developed during the Cold War years (the ‘Middle East’, ‘Arab Middle East’, ‘Muslim Middle East’ and ‘Mediterranean Middle East’) each one of which give primacy to different kinds of threats.17 It will be argued that when rethinking regional security in the ‘Middle East’, students of Critical Security Studies need to pay attention to regional people’s conceptions of security; what they view as the referent; and how they think security should be established in this part of the world. The aim is to show how difficult it is to generalize about questions of security; how people’s ideas about security differ from one another; and how they changed in the past and might change in the future. Within the context of the ‘Middle East’ this amounts to amplifying the voices of those whose views have been left out of security analyses and pointing to possibilities for change that exist. This is not meant to suggest that these alternatives should not be put under critical scrutiny. The role of students of Critical Security Studies should not be merely to represent those views that have so far been marginalized by the dominant approaches, but also to critically analyse them. To adopt a relativist perspective and argue that all approaches voice the concerns of their proponents and are therefore equally valid is not helpful (especially if one is interested in pointing to possible avenues for change). It is even less desirable in places like the ‘Middle East’ where contending conceptions of security often clash. A striking example of this can be found in Israel/Palestine. ‘Peace is my security’ is what a PeaceNow activist’s banner read when celebrating the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.18 But ‘peace with security’ has long been the motto of those Israelis sceptical of the virtues of an Arab–Israeli peace agreement. Rather, the role of the student of Critical Security Studies is to adopt a ‘critical distance’,19 to ‘anchor’ 20 him/herself by being self-conscious and open about other versions of ‘reality’ and by reflecting upon his/her own role as an intellectual and the effects of the research on its subject matter.21 Within the Middle Eastern context this involves being sensitive towards conceptions of security adopted by the region’s peoples, representing the ideas and experiences of those who have been marginalized by the dominant discourses and drawing up an alternative template for thinking about regional security that promotes emancipatory practices. This will be the focus of the final section of the article. The ‘Middle East’ What I call the ‘Middle East’ perspective is usually associated with the United States and its regional allies. It derives from a ‘western’ conception of security which could be summed up as the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon while holding Islamism in check, and the maintenance of ‘friendly’ regimes that are sensitive to these concerns. This was (and still is) a topdown conception of security that privileged the security of states and military stability. It is top-down because threats to security have been defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. In the eyes of British and US defence planners, Communist infiltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threat to security in the ‘Middle East’ during the Cold War. The way to enhance regional security, they argued, was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West. Two security umbrella schemes, the ill-born Middle East Defence Organisation (1951) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), Iran (until the 1978–9 revolution) and Turkey that shared this perception of security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers begged to differ.22 Traces of this top-down thinking were prevalent in the US approach to security in the ‘Middle East’ during the 1990s. In following a policy of dual containment,23 US policy-makers presented Iran and Iraq as the main threats to regional security largely due to their military capabilities and the revisionist character of their regimes that are not subservient to US interests. However, these top-down perspectives, while revealing certain aspects of regional insecurity, at the same time hinder others. For example the lives of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are made insecure not only by the threat caused by their Gulf neighbours’ military capabilities, but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes that restrict women’s rights under the cloak of religious tradition.24 For it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism and the channelling of valuable resources into defence budgets instead of education and health. Their concerns rarely make it into security analyses. This top-down approach to regional security in the ‘Middle East’ was compounded by a conception of security that was directed outwards – that is threats to security were assumed to stem from outside the state whereas inside is viewed as a realm of peace. Although it could be argued – following R.B.J. Walker – that what makes it possible for ‘inside’ to remain peaceful is the presentation of ‘outside’ as a realm of danger,25 the practices of Middle Eastern states indicate that this does not always work as prescribed in theory. For many regional policy-makers justify certain domestic security measures by way of presenting the international arena as anarchical and stressing the need to strengthen the state to cope with external threats. While doing this, however, they at the same time cause insecurity for some individuals and social groups at home – the very peoples whose security they purport to maintain. The practices of regional actors that do not match up to the theoretical prescriptions include the Baath regime in Iraq that infringed their own citizens’ rights often for the purposes of state security. Those who dare to challenge their states’ security practices may be marginalized at best, and accused of treachery and imprisoned at worst. The military priority of security thinking in the Cold War manifested itself within the Middle Eastern context by regional as well as external actors’ reliance on practices such as heavy defence outlays, concern with orders-of-battle, joint military exercises and defence pacts. For example, the British and US security practices during this period took the form of defending regional states against external intervention by way of helping them to strengthen their defences and acquiring military bases in the region as well as bolstering ‘friendly’ regimes’ stronghold over their populace so that the ‘Middle East’ would become inviolable to Soviet infiltration and intervention. The ‘Middle East’ perspective continues to be military-focused and stability oriented in the post-Cold War era. US policy towards Iraq before and after the Gulf War (1990–1) and the 1998–9 bombing campaign directed at obtaining Iraqi cooperation with the UN team inspecting the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme could be viewed as examples of this. What has changed in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks is that US policy-makers declared commitment to ‘advancing freedom’ in the Middle East as a way of ‘confronting the threats to peace from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’.26 The 2003 ‘war on Iraq’ and the US effort to change the Iraqi regime were explained with reference to this new policy priority. At the same time, US policy-makers sought to give momentum to Israeli–Palestinian peacemaking by presenting a new ‘roadmap’. For the peace process (that began in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War) had come to a halt towards the end of the 1990s for reasons largely to do with the incongruities between the US perspective of regional security and those of regional states. Among the latter, the critique brought by the proponents of what I term the ‘Arab’ perspective is likely to be of particular significance for the attempts to jump-start Arab–Israeli peacemaking. The ‘Arab Middle East’ The ‘Arab’ perspective derives from the concept ‘Arab national security’ that emphasizes the attainment of a set of pan-Arab security concerns. The concept ‘Arab national security’ was developed in the aftermath of the Second World War in reaction to Cold War approaches to regional security in the ‘Middle East’ that were viewed as a ‘euphemism for secure spheres of influence for either Moscow or Washington’.27 Arab nationalists regard the term ‘Middle East’ as a label designed at best to underplay the ‘Arab’ character of this part of the world and at worst to ‘tear up’ the ‘Arab homeland’ as a distinct unit.28 Accordingly, they have viewed the reasoning behind the western usage of the term ‘Middle East’ to portray the land mass covered by this definition as an ethnic mosaic, thereby discrediting the rationale behind the calls for greater ‘Arab unity’. The term ‘Arab regional system’, it has been argued, could serve better as a key for understanding the interactions among Arab states with their neighbours and with the international system. There are two main assumptions behind this argument. One is that the security concerns and interests of ‘Arab’ states could be better understood when viewed in relation to one another. Second, that these concerns are different from if not opposed to those of neighbouring ‘non-Arab’ states (Iran, Israel and Turkey). However, what is often left out of these analyses is the fact that the definition of ‘Arab’ is hugely contested among ‘Arab’ peoples themselves, and that the land mass covered by this alternative spatial conception is home to a considerable number of other peoples including Kurds and Turks.29 By looking at their referent(s) for security one could tease out two different approaches to ‘Arab national security’. The one propounded by Baghat Korany treats Arab civil society as the referent for security.30 Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil Mattar, on the other hand, focus on the society of ‘Arab’ states.31 Both approaches constitute significant departures from the neo-realist view of the ‘Arab world’ as a ‘conglomeration of hard-shelled, billiard ball, sovereign states’32 interacting under the conditions set by international anarchy. Furthermore, Dessouki and Mattar’s stress on the societal dimension of security and Korany’s emphasis on its non-military aspects (such as identity and welfare) echo the 1990s debates on broadening security.33 Korany presents the concept of ‘Arab national security’ as complementary to Cold War approaches that failed to deal with the societal dimension of security. He argues that in order to understand security in the ‘Arab world’, one needs to move away from a state-focused outlook and consider the security concerns voiced by myriad societal actors. These concerns differ depending on the socioeconomic background of the actors voicing them. In general those higher on the economic ladder push for democratization and respect for human rights, while those at the lower levels of the ladder are primarily concerned with achieving daily economic needs such as jobs, socioeconomic equality, health provision and in some cases daily food subsistence.34 As opposed to the emphasis Korany puts on civil society, Dessouki and Mattar treat the society of ‘Arab’ states as the referent for security. Their critique of Cold War approaches stems not so much from the way security was conceived and practised, but with its referent, i.e. the ‘Middle East’. From this perspective, Iran, Israel and Turkey (that are included within most definitions of the ‘Middle East’) as well as extra-regional states (such as the United States) could be viewed as threats to ‘Arab national security’. The practices of ‘Arab’ states, on the other hand, indicate that while they do not adopt the ‘Arab’ civil society as their referent for security, they nevertheless find it difficult to act in total defiance of the concerns voiced by myriad nongovernmental actors. Although the security practices of the ‘Arab’ policy-makers have always been statist, undertaken largely to enhance their own regime security under the mantle of state security, it is impossible to deny the fact that they have also been concerned, if only at the discursive level, with the well-being of ‘Arab’ peoples.35 The place accorded to the Israel/Palestine issue on top of Arab national security agendas (declared repeatedly at the end of Arab League meetings since the late 1940s) when viewed against the background of the decrease in the number of concrete actions taken to find a solution to the plight of the Palestinian peoples is an indication of the delicate balancing act many Arab policy-makers have engaged in in the second half of the 20th century – an act that became even more delicate in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks when the US began to put pressure on conservative and radical Arab regimes alike. The point here is that the security concerns of Arab peoples have often been at odds with, and have constituted a constraint upon, the practices of Arab policy-makers that have prioritized the security of their regimes.36 Consequently, the argument that ‘Arab’ states have always prioritized state security, as reflected in the Charter of the League of Arab States, only reflects one dimension of this interplay between state security and societal security in the ‘Arab world’. The concept of Arab national security constitutes a development over Cold War approaches to security in a number of ways. First, it is generated by peoples in this part of the world and reflects (some, if not all of) their security concerns that did not make it onto the agendas set by the ‘Middle East’ perspective. It also partially does away with the top-down perspective of the Cold War approaches – only partially because it substitutes the top-down perspective of the United States with the statist and top-down perspectives of the ‘Arab’ states that often act in defiance of the concerns of peoples and social groups. As noted above, only Korany’s approach attempts to move beyond such statist and top-down approaches. Lastly, it emphasizes the non-military aspects of security, especially that of identity. As opposed to the stress the proponents of the ‘Arab’ perspective put on national identity, myriad Islamist actors emphasize its religious dimension. The ‘Muslim Middle East’ What I term the Islamist perspective is the most controversial among the four. Even those observers of the region who are fervent critics of the regional status quo have their reservations about an Islamist perspective that has been hijacked by the ‘radicals’ following the 11 September attacks against New York and Washington, DC. Before Osama bin Laden and his version of ‘Islamism’ came to dominate the US security agenda, the anti-status quo discourses and violent practices of certain Islamist actors, notably the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sudan and organizations such as Hizbullah and Hamas, were already viewed as constituting a challenge to the military stability the United States and its regional allies have been keen to maintain. Still, the proponents of the Islamist perspective have also included pro-status quo actors such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-backed Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). The divergent practices of these Islamist actors range from militant activism (such as the New York Trade Center bombing in 1993) to grassroots activities providing welfare services (such as the activities of FIS – the Islamic Salvation Front – in Algeria and Hamas in Israel/Palestine); from the use of Islamic motifs to enhance regime security (such as Saudi Arabia) to advocating political violence aimed at establishing an ‘Islamic’ state (as with Hizbullah in Lebanon). It is not only the security practices but also the referent object of the Islamist perspective – the ‘Muslim world’ – that is questionable. Defined as the sum of Muslim peoples around the world (the Ummah), the ‘Muslim world’ is a transstate community that encompasses a significant portion of the globe. When Islamists in the ‘Middle East’ speak of the ‘Muslim world’, however, they refer to a Middle East-centred conception. Security is defined by the proponents of this perspective in relation to two criteria: the lessening of ‘un-Islamic’ influences and the achievement of greater unity of Muslim peoples which would ultimately enable them to be ‘virtuous and powerful’.37 Arguably, there is more agreement among the proponents of the Islamist perspective as to what they are against than what they are for. They often define ‘un-Islamic’ influences as the major threat to their security, but there is little agreement among these actors as to what constitutes ‘un-Islamic’ (or ‘Islamic’ for that matter). Some would consider ‘western’ influence over and intervention in the region as ‘un-Islamic’. Some Islamists criticize the existing political and religious establishments (such as the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that allowed US troops to step on the ‘holy lands’) as well as the forces of Arab nationalism as being ‘un-Islamic’. Lastly, there are those who define ‘structural violence’ as ‘un-Islamic’ and call for its erosion.38 The actions and demands of these Islamist organizations serve as a reminder of how problematic is the task of defining security. From the perspective of the governments of the United States, Egypt and Israel, most Islamist organizations constitute threats to regional security due to their anti-status quo discourses and (at times) violent practices. Viewed through the lenses of some regional peoples, these organizations serve as agents of security by providing welfare services that the state fails to provide. On the other hand, from the perspective of some women, these Islamist actors constitute a significant threat. For it is women who get caught in the middle when Islamist actors – be it Iran, Saudi Arabia or FIS – play up their ‘Islamic’ credentials.39 This could be taken as an illustration of the general point that the very same actors that could be considered as engaging in emancipatory practices (when viewed from a Critical Security Studies perspective) at the same time create insecurity for some others. In sum, although the Islamist perspective makes a contribution by criticizing top-down and statist approaches to security, it still suffers from a conception of security that is directed outwards in that threats to Muslims are assumed to stem from outside the ‘Muslim Middle East’ whereas what goes on inside is rendered almost unproblematic. Moreover, the internal politics of Islamist movements and organizations themselves remain top-down especially concerning women’s issues. One important contribution the Islamist perspective has made is the emphasis some of its proponents have put on the non-military dimensions of security, such as religious identity and the little-pronounced but significant redefinition of jihad (holy war) as a struggle against ‘structural violence’. As Chaiwat Satha-Anand notes, there exist in the Islamic tradition ‘fertile resources of nonviolent thought’ should Islamist actors choose to tap them.40 The point here is that although it is possible to view the Islamist perspective as the most uncompromising among the four, should its proponents choose to rethink some key precepts of Islam, a concept such as jihad that is often viewed as an obstacle to peaceful coexistence today could become the common ground for tomorrow’s debates between the Islamists and other actors (notably non-governmental actors at the local and global levels) on issues such as the structural causes of economic security, human rights, identity, human dignity and equality – that is, the nexus of security and emancipation. The ‘Mediterranean Middle East’ The Mediterranean perspective began to take shape from the 1970s onwards, largely in line with the development of and changing security conceptions and practices of the European Union. The EU’s close interest in Middle Eastern affairs was provoked by the OPEC oil embargo and the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. Since then, EU policies towards the ‘Middle East’ have been shaped by three major concerns: energy security, regional stability (understood as the maintenance of domestic stability in the countries in the geographically close North Africa) and the cessation of the Arab–Israeli conflict. In the 1980s, changes in the societies of EU member states as a result of the growth of the Middle Eastern diaspora in Western Europe led EU policy-makers to rethink their priorities, and come to consider stability in the ‘Middle East’ (especially North Africa) as an integral part of their own security. Accordingly, EU policy-makers have sought to create cooperative schemes with the Mediterranean-rim countries of the ‘Middle East’ to encourage and support economic development and growth. It was hoped these steps would serve to reduce refugee flows from the ‘Middle East’ into Europe, and prevent regional conflicts being exported into Europe. Over the years these schemes have taken various forms: the Euro–Arab Dialogue, the EU’s ‘Overall Mediterranean Policy’, agreements with sub-regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean’ (CSCM) proposal and the ongoing ‘Euro–Mediterranean Partnership’ process.41 Although other actors such as the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), Egyptian policy-makers and intellectuals have also encouraged and supported some of these schemes, the EU has been the prime actor in constructing the Mediterranean as a region.42 The EU’s conceptualization of the Mediterranean does not (so far) include nonMediterranean Middle Eastern states. This is largely because the EU’s delineation of the Mediterranean region reflects its own societal security concerns that have less to do with the Gulf than the geographically closer Southern Mediterranean. Furthermore, in line with its conviction that the threat and use of force would not solve those problems that are non-military in character, the EU has so far emphasized democratization and economic development as the means to establish security in the Mediterranean region. On the issue of Gulf security, however, many EU policy-makers still follow the US lead and do not rule out the threat and use of force as an instrument of policy (as the Gulf War demonstrated). Although the EU remains divided over this issue, many member states subscribe to US conceptions (and practices) of security in the Gulf, which prioritize military stability and predictability over democratization and development. The debates within the EU regarding the 2003 war on Iraq could be viewed as signalling a deepening of divisions within the EU, and between the EU and the US. The main strength of the Mediterranean perspective stems from the fact that it is a relatively neutral conception; it does not a priori exclude some states or have colonial baggage. Moreover it remains the only scheme that managed to bring Syria, Israel and a wide spectrum of non-state actors together under one umbrella. Although the CSCM proposal (1990) failed to start a Helsinki-type process in the Mediterranean, European actors at the sub-state level have been active in conducting people-to-people diplomacy. In sum, the Mediterranean region largely serves the security interests of the EU and does not have many enthusiastic supporters in the region. However, although it has very few backers in the ‘Middle East’, it does not have many enemies either; and this may eventually turn out to be its greatest strength especially if the EU policy to take civil societal actors on its side bears fruit in the long run. Which region for what future? The four approaches outlined here serve as reminders of the fact that basic needs such as subsistence, health and education, and issues such as religious and cultural identity, democratization and human rights may rate higher on individuals’ and social groups’ security agendas than regime security and military stability that have dominated the security agendas of the United States and its regional allies. Although US policy-makers’ view – that military instability in the ‘Middle East’ threatens global (economic) security – remains valid, it merely captures one dimension of regional insecurity. The security concerns voiced by various actors from within the region attest well to this. Furthermore, conceiving security in the ‘Middle East’ solely in terms of military stability helps gloss over other structurally based (economic, political and societal) security concerns. Dealing with the military security agenda is always necessary, but a military-focused and determined security agenda (coupled with zero-sum conceptions and practices of security) has so far led to a diversion of valuable resources into arms purchases//////////////////////////. The ensuing militarization of the region not only made it difficult to meet the traditional challenges, but also undermined the regional states’ capacity to provide welfare to their citizens thereby exacerbating the non-military threats to security in the ‘Middle East’ as voiced by myriad non-state actors.